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TAKINGS, COMMUNITY, AND VALUE:
REFORMING TAKINGS LAW TO FAIRLY
COMPENSATE COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES
Shai Stern*
This Article argues that individuals who live in highly cooperative
common interest communities should, in certain instances, be entitled to
additional compensation or other remedies when their property is taken
through eminent domain. The exclusive takings remedy of monetary
compensation equal to the fair market value of the property cannot always
account for loss of communality. This Article offers guidelines for allocation
of additional remedies (monetary and in-kind) that recognize such loss. This
proposal is grounded in a pluralistic conception of property, which holds
that the state should support individuals’ use of property as a social
instrument to fulfill diverse values and beliefs. To that end, the state should
balance several factors to determine whether a member of a community, or a
community as a whole, should be entitled to remedies for communal loss: (1)
the size and scope of the taking within the community; (2) the role, if any, of
the community’s cooperation in its members’ realization of a shared
conception of the good; (3) the community’s social legitimacy as determined
primarily by its structural openness, that is, its members’ ability to
simultaneously belong to other communities; and (4) the community’s ability
to self-rehabilitate as determined by its political and economic strength. The
state should also consider these factors in determining which of several
types of remedies for communality loss would be most appropriate.

* Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University. I am grateful to Gregory S. Alexander,
Elizabeth Anderson, Hanoch Dagan, Tsilli Dagan, Avital Margalit, Ayelet
Shachar, Jeff Spinner-Halev, Joseph W. Singer and Laura S. Underkuffler on
their perceptive comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, as well as to
participants of the Tel Aviv University Law School Doctoral Colloquium (2013)
and the “Human Rights and Judaism” workshop at the Israel Democracy
Institute (2013).
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INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have witnessed increases in cultural diversity,
social polarization, and residential segregation, all of which have
altered the forms and functions of property ownership in the
United States.1 One prominent expression of these changes is the
growth of residential common interest communities (CICs)
(alternatively called common interest developments) as a dominant
form of housing in many metropolitan areas. These developments
are characterized by at least a certain degree of cooperation among
members. With more than 323,000 common interest communities
housing 63.4 million residents in the United States,2 it is no
wonder that they have attracted so much attention from legal
scholars.3 Much of the research focuses on these communities’
internal governance regimes4 and these regimes’ externalities.5
1

Michael Pacione, Proprietary Residential Communities in the United
States, 96 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 543, 543 (2006).
2
See Industry Data, CMTY. ASS’NS INST., http://www.caionline.
org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
3
See Patrick J. Rohan, Preparing Community Associations for the
Twenty-First Century: Anticipating the Legal Problems and Possible Solutions,
73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 3, 5–6 (1999) (“Whether one focuses on the housing
pattern in large cities or upon suburbia, one is led inexorably to the conclusion
that the age of community association living, as opposed to renting or owning a
one-family home, is upon us. The rental market in every urban center is rapidly
disappearing as high-rise buildings are torn down, devoted to commercial uses,
or converted into condominium or cooperative housing.”).
4
See, e.g., WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW (2d ed. 1988);
Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common,
23 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1995); Mark Fenster, Community by Covenant, Process, and
Design: Cohousing and the Contemporary Common Interest Community, 15 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 3 (1999); Susan F. French, Making Common Interest
Communities Work: The Next Step, 37 URB. LAW. 359 (2005); Norman Geis,
Beyond the Condominium: The Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act, 17
REAL PROP PROB. & TR. J. 757 (1982); Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest
Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303 (1997);
Evan McKenzie, Common-Interest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow,
14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 203 (2003) [hereinafter McKenzie, CommonInterest Housing]; Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest
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This Article focuses on another property law issue that this
growing phenomenon raises, which has so far been neglected in
the literature: the intersection of takings law and CICs. Monetary
compensation equal to the fair market value of the property is
typically the exclusive remedy for individuals when the
government takes their property through eminent domain.6 In most
circumstances, this compensation is fair and sufficient. Yet, for
many individuals who reside in highly cooperative CICs, market
value compensation hardly places them in the same position they
would have been in had their property not been taken. This is
because the loss of the property also damages the community in
and of itself.
This Article therefore argues that, in certain instances,
individuals and even communities as a whole should be entitled to
additional remedies for loss of communality. Mere membership in
a CIC, however, is not necessarily a reliable indicator of communal
loss. CICs vary greatly in purpose and level of cooperation,
ranging
from
hyper-individualist
to
ultra-collectivist.7
Developments: Reflections on a Policy Role for the Judiciary, 31 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 397 (1997) [hereinafter McKenzie, Common Interest Developments].
5
See, e.g., NAN ELLIN, ARCHITECTURE OF FEAR (1997); Gregory S.
Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989); Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized
Communities and the “Secession of the Successful”: Democracy and Fairness
Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675 (2000); Paula A. Franzese,
Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and the Rise
of Government for “the Nice”, 37 URB. LAW. 335 (2005); Amnon Lehavi,
Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137 (2008); Stephanie M. Stern, The
Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in Residential Property Law,
99 VA. L. REV. 811 (2013).
6
U.S. C ONST . amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16
(1970) (“The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. And ‘just compensation’ means the
full monetary equivalent of the property taken. The owner is to be put in the
same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not
been taken. In enforcing the constitutional mandate, the Court at an early date
adopted the concept of market value: the owner is entitled to the fair market
value of the property at the time of the taking.”).
7
Alexander, supra note 5, at 3–4.
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Furthermore, while the law recognizes several forms of CICs, the
actual differences among them do not always correspond to these
legal distinctions. Takings law should reflect true differences in
communality. While the sole remedy of market value payment may
provide adequate compensation for members of individualistic
communities, it may not do so for members of communities
characterized by a greater degree of cooperation. This Article
argues that, insofar as we conceive of these communities as
legitimate, we should design our legal rules to allow them to
function properly.8
The issue of how takings law should treat CICs relates to an
ongoing debate about the role of community and cooperation in
property. As I demonstrate below, none of the most popular
conceptions of property support differential treatment of CICs in
takings law. This is because these conceptions are all structured
around a single, all-encompassing meaning of “community” that
fails to recognize important differences between CICs and other
residential configurations, as well as differences among various
kinds of CICs. A different conception is therefore necessary.
Drawing on Elizabeth Anderson’s conception of foundational
value pluralism,9 this Article argues that a differential treatment of
CICs in takings law is indeed normatively justified, and can be
grounded in a pluralistic conception of property. A foundational
pluralistic conception of property holds that property should be
viewed as a social instrument, which different individuals can use
to fulfill their basic values and beliefs.10 This understanding turns
8

HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 106 (2011).
Foundational pluralism is the view that “there are plural values at the
most basic level—that is to say, there is no one value that subsumes all other
values, no one property of goodness, and no overarching principle of action.”
See Elinor Mason, Value Pluralism, in S TANFORD E NCYCLOPEDIA O F
P HILOSOPHY (first published June 20, 2006; substantive revision July 29, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/#FouNorPlu.
Elizabeth
Anderson embraces the foundational pluralistic view and argues that “people
experience the world as infused with many different values.” ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1, 149 (1995). The state,
according to Anderson, should accommodate its institutions to social diversity,
allowing each person to live according to his or her values and beliefs. See id.
10
Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L.
9
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property into a locus of competing values, which justifies different
legal arrangements tailored to specific communities. Many
individuals seek to fulfill their notion of the good by residing in a
particular community where they cooperate with others who share
those same values.11 This Article proposes guidelines for
reforming takings law’s compensation scheme to include
additional monetary and in-kind remedies for communal loss that
CIC members may incur when the government takes their
property. Policymakers should balance several factors in
determining the proper remedy when the government takes
property from a CIC.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I illustrates the great
extent to which CICs may differ in their underlying values and the
nature and extent of cooperation among their members. It explains
how the existing takings remedy scheme uniquely harms highly
cooperative CICs at both the individual and the community level.
This Part also explains why, despite the normative appeal of
distinguishing among CICs in takings law, current law poses a
practical barrier to such a policy. Part II proposes guidelines for
implementing a new takings remedy scheme. It argues that three
factors are important in determining whether, and to what extent, a
community, or individual within a community, should be entitled
to additional remedies in the face of expropriation. Those factors
are: (1) the role, if any, of the community’s cooperation in its
members’ realization of a shared conception of the good; (2) the
community’s social legitimacy as determined primarily by its
structural openness, that is, its members’ ability to simultaneously
belong to other communities; and (3) the community’s political
and economic strength. Part III introduces additional takings
remedies and discusses how the interplay of the three factors
discussed in Part II should affect the selection of a remedy (or
remedies) for a given taking. Finally, Part IV addresses three main
REV. 1017, 1036 (2011).
11
For the purposes of this article, John Rawls’s definition of a conception
of the good may be best. According to Rawls, a definition of the good should
consist “of a more or less determined scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want
to realize for their own sake.” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EXPANDED
EDITION 19 (2011).
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arguments against deviating from market value compensation in
certain circumstances: (1) the subjective nature of communal loss;
(2) heightened commodification effects; and (3) the undermining
of state neutrality; and concludes that these objections do not
significantly weaken the case for recognizing loss of communality
in the law of takings.
I.

ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: VARIATION AMONG COMMON
INTEREST COMMUNITIES

CICs may differ in their underlying values as well as in their
nature and the extent of cooperation among their members. The
current takings remedy scheme uniquely harms highly cooperative
CICs at the level of both the individual and the community at
large. This Part explains why, despite the normative appeal of
distinguishing among CICs in takings law, current law poses a
practical barrier to the establishment of such a policy.
A. Common Interest Communities and the Law
Common interest communities take numerous forms, but the
three12 most common are: (1) condominiums, in which every unit
12

A fourth legal framework for community formation is through state
legislation that enables groups of property owners to incorporate as highly
autonomous local communities. This legal framework allows the operation of
one of the most controversial communities in the U.S., namely, the Satmar
Hasidic community of Kiryas Joel, New York. The Supreme Court criticized
this framework, but did not invalidate it. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill.
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712 (1994) (“Fortunately for the Satmars,
New York state law had a way of accommodating their concerns. New York
allows virtually any group of residents to incorporate their own village, with
broad powers of self-government. The Satmars followed this course,
incorporating their community as the village of Kiryas Joel, and their zoning
problems, at least, were solved.”); see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, The
Puzzling Persistence of Community: The Cases of Airmont and Kiryas Joel, in
FROM GHETTO TO EMANCIPATION: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
RECONSIDERATIONS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY 75 (David N. Myers &
William V. Rowe eds., 1997). For the exercising of this legal framework by
other communities as well, see Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community
Self-Governance in Residential Associations Municipalities and Indian Country:
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is owned in fee simple by a particular owner, while the common
areas are owned by all unit owners jointly;13 (2) homeowners
associations, in which individual homeowners within a housing
subdivision become members of an association that owns the
common property;14 and (3) housing cooperatives, in which a
cooperative housing corporation owns all of the real property and
issues stock and proprietary leases to tenant-stockholders.15
The law has played an important role in allowing CICs to
flourish.16 Since the New York Court of Appeals’ 1938 decision in
Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings
Bank,17 courts across the United States have developed a legal
framework that enables CICs to function.18 The framework
established in Neponsit—which several uniform laws19 and the

A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1082–86 (1998).
13
JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES
825 (1997); HYATT, supra note 4, at 13–14; Geis, supra note 4, at 760–61.
14
HYATT, supra note 4, at 204–05; Geis, supra note 4, at 765.
15
PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW
AND PRACTICE § 9.01, .02 (1998) (setting forth the governing structure of
residential cooperatives); HYATT, supra note 4, at 21; SINGER, supra note 13, at
826; Fenster, supra note 4, at 19; Geis, supra note 4, at 760; Phillip N. Smith,
Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership,
16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 305–17 (1961) (outlining various species of
residential cooperatives’ structures).
16
For the historical and jurisprudential foundations of common interest
developments, see Sharmeen C. Bamarni, Note, Residential Associations and
the Concept of Consensual Governance, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 91, 92 (1986)
and Todd Brower, Communities within the Community: Consent,
Constitutionalism, and other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential
Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 208–16 (1992).
17
15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
18
See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275,
1290 (Cal. 1994); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Perry v. Bridgetown Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1230,
1233 (Miss. 1986).
19
The Uniform Condominium Act project led to three other related acts:
MODEL REAL ESTATE COOPERATION ACT, 7B U.L.A. 225 (1981), UNIF.
PLANNED CMTY ACT, 7B U.L.A. 1 (1980), and UNIF. COMMON INTEREST
OWNERSHIP ACT, 7 U.L.A. 231 (1982), superseded by 7 U.L.A. 171 (1994 &
Supp. 1995).
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Restatement of Property embrace20—consists of a web of
servitudes that ties certain rights and obligations to property
ownership.21 No owner in a CIC can unilaterally terminate
servitudes burdening the property or transfer the property free of
such servitudes without the consent of other beneficiaries.22
Practically, most CICs are established through documents that set
forth the web of obligations imposed on the members. These
documents are typically comprised of “declarations” containing a
set of conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs),23 which
primarily regulate the governing framework of the development,
but also impose restrictions on the development’s members’ use of
private property.24 These restrictions significantly constrain
individuals’ use of their property.25
20

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6 (2000).
Id. at intro. note (“Servitudes underlie all common-interest
communities, regardless of the ownership and organizational forms used. They
provide the mechanism by which the obligations to share financial responsibility
for common property and services and to submit to the management and
enforcement powers of the community association are imposed on present and
future owners of the property in the community.”).
22
See Cullen v. Tarini, 15 A.3d 968 (R.I. 2011) (holding that an
injunction can be granted to stop an owner from deliberately and knowingly
violating a restrictive covenant).
23
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6 (2000)
(“‘Declaration’ means the recorded document or documents containing the
servitudes that create and govern the common-interest community.”); id. § 6.2.6
(“‘Governing documents’ means the declaration and other documents, such as
the articles of incorporation or articles of association, bylaws, and rules and
regulations, that govern the operation of a common-interest association, or
determine the rights and obligations of the members of the common-interest
community.”).
24
See, e.g., Franzese, supra note 5, at 336–37 (“Covenants have been
devised to regulate everything from whether pets are permitted, what the
maximum weight of an allowed pet must be, the permissibility and, if permitted,
the design of one’s doghouse and birdhouse, the precise contours of landscaping
content and style, the architectural style of one’s home, the color of one’s home,
the color of one’s shutters, the color of one’s interior drapes, the permissibility
of screen doors, the posting of signs, and even the propriety of wok-cooking.”).
25
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. note (2000). See
also Arabian, supra note 4, at 1–4; Franzese, supra note 5, at 336–37; Paula A.
Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and Review of
21
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American property law is generally deferential to the
obligations that CC&Rs impose on property owners. Except when
CC&Rs clash directly with other laws,26 judicial intervention in an
association’s enforcement of its CC&Rs is usually limited to
applying a reasonableness standard.27 In this way, property law
recognizes distinctions among different forms of property
ownership.28 Unlike fee simple ownership, ownership within a CIC
may be subject to restrictions that other owners impose. The law’s
recognition and acceptance of this distinction led property scholar
Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 663, 771–75 (2000).
26
Courts tend to distinguish between regulations appearing in the original
documents, which will not be invalidated unless they are wholly arbitrary or
when they violate public policy or fundamental constitutional rights, and those
put into effect by the board of directors, which are subject to a more stringent
standard of reasonableness. See, e.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393
So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“Such restrictions are very much
in the nature of covenants running with the land and they will not be invalidated
absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation
of public policy, or that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.”).
See also Arabian, supra note 4, at 12–13; Franzese, supra note 25, at 685–93.
27
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000) (“A
servitude created as provided in Chapter 2 is valid unless it is illegal or
unconstitutional or violates public policy.”); id. § 6.7 (“Except as limited by
statute or the governing documents, a common-interest community has an
implied power to adopt reasonable rules to: (a) govern the use of the common
property, and (b) govern the use of individually owned property to protect the
common property.”). See also Seagate Condo. Ass’n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484,
486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (“The test which our courts have adopted and
applied with respect to restraints on alienation and use is reasonableness.”);
Holiday Out in America at St. Lucie, Inc. v. Bowes, 285 So. 2d 63, 66 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973) (Mager, J., dissenting) (“The individual condominium unit
owner should be permitted to freely alienate or use his condominium property
subject to the reasonable limitations imposed by condominium ownership and as
otherwise allowable by law.”).
28
See Perry v. Bridgetown Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1230, 1233
(Miss. 1986) (“More recently, however, our society has become more complex,
and land use has become more diversified. The more populous areas use land
not only for single or multiple residences in subdivision developments, but for
new arrangements of homeowners associations and planned unit developments.
The latter have given rise to a new body of law. This Court is called upon to
address the unique roles and functions in the special relationship of the
homeowner, the association, and third parties that deal with the association.”).
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Gregory Alexander to state that courts regard CICs “as new forms
of residency, fundamentally different from both traditional fee
ownership of the detached house and apartment living.”29 These
new forms of ownership, which subordinate an individual’s
property rights to the collective judgment of the owners
association, “comprise the chief attributes of owning property in a
common interest development.”30
Notwithstanding the above, takings law has not evolved with
the rapid growth of CICs. While CICs vary greatly in their
purposes and levels of cooperation, takings law offers only one
remedy—fair market value monetary compensation—to an owner
whose property is condemned through eminent domain, whether he
owns a house in fee simple, a condominium, or a share in a highly
communal housing cooperative.31
This “one-size-fits-all” policy is problematic insofar as we
conceive of property as a pluralistic institution, through which
owners may express different values. The theoretical debate over
property’s characteristics is the subject of an enormous amount of
literature and therefore goes far beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, in order to explain the incompatibility of takings
law’s “one-size-fits-all” policy with the wide range of CICs, it is
sufficient to recognize the contributions of several property
scholars who have highlighted the importance of the ways in which
communities facilitate the expression of human values through
property ownership. For example, from a law and economics
perspective, Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman argue that
takings should be compensated differently for certain residential
communities because of the additional loss of communality.32
Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver developed another, more
robust conception of community in the context of property

29
30

Alexander, supra note 5, at 11.
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Cal.

1994).
31

See supra note 4 and accompanying sources.
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:
Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 136
(2004).
32
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ownership.33 According to Alexander and Peñalver, “[t]he
communities in which we find ourselves play crucial roles in the
formation of our preferences, the extent of our expectations and the
scope of our aspirations”34 and therefore, owners should be under
an obligation to “participate in and support the social networks and
structures that enable us to develop those human capabilities that
make human flourishing possible.”35 Joseph Singer argues for
increased obligations of owners toward society (or the community)
in which they live,36 while Hanoch Dagan suggests a
comprehensive liberal conception of property, in which the
government must consider community when establishing property
institutions.37
Although each of these scholars subscribes to a different school
of thought, they all recognize the pluralistic nature of property.
More concretely, they recognize conceptions of property that
permit the consideration of personal values. Elizabeth Anderson’s
pluralistic theory takes this understanding a step further. Anderson
argues that since “people experience the world as infused with
many different values,” the state should be obligated to allow all
people to live by their values through establishment of diverse
social institutions that people can use to promote these values.38
Anderson therefore argues that the state should be obligated to
“expand the range of significant opportunities open to its citizens
by supporting institutions that enable them to govern themselves
by the norms internal to the modes of valuation appropriate to
different kinds of good.”39
Applying Anderson’s insights to takings law, the state should
be required not only to allow people to live in accordance with
33

Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of
Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 134 (2008).
34
Id. at 140.
35
Id. at 143.
36
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
PROPERTY (2001); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS
ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP (2001).
37
DAGAN, supra note 8, at xvii.
38
ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 1, 149.
39
Id.
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their values and beliefs, but also to provide them with the practical
possibility of doing so.40 This pluralistic obligation, as set out
below, should guide us in determining the proper treatment of
residential communities in takings law. In particular, the state’s
pluralistic obligation justifies expanding the range of takings
compensation mechanisms and remedies. In view of the state’s
pluralistic obligation, the current remedy scheme in takings law is
problematic for two overarching reasons: 1) it leads to
discriminatory outcomes and 2) it prevents the growth of highly
cooperative CICs.
First, the one-size-fits-all approach actually leads to
discriminatory outcomes by violating the property rights of certain
members of CICs. This is because it fails to recognize the harm
caused by what Parchomovsky and Siegelman term “loss of
communality,” which represents the loss of interpersonal ties that
“are not fully captured by the market value of the properties.”41
Individuals who are displaced from their communities due to
eminent domain proceedings may no longer be able to realize a
conception of the good that depends on cooperation with other
community members. Consider a member of a religious
community who—to comply with his religious conception of the
good—is required to cooperate with others who hold the same
religious beliefs. When this person’s property is taken, he may lose
not only land or a physical dwelling, but also his ability to
cooperate with fellow community members to realize a shared
40

As will be demonstrated in Part III below, this obligation is primarily in
place to ensure citizens’ ability to realize and maintain their conceptions of the
good. Therefore, in the case of communities, the state may be obligated to not
only provide a one-time monetary compensation for expropriation, but assist
with a community’s resettlement. And in cases where the community’s
conception of the good is not threatened (since the expropriation does not uproot
the entire community, for example), this obligation may still require the state, in
some instances, to pay the individual property owner who loses her individual
ability to cooperate with others additional compensation. In this sense, the
state’s pluralistic obligation has two dimensions: a collective one (in cases
where the realization of community members’ shared conception of the good is
threatened) and an individualistic one (where an individual is no longer able to
cooperate with her community to realize her conception of the good).
41
Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 136.
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conception of the good. Compensation that merely provides him
with a payment equal to the market value of the confiscated
property ignores this type of loss. Moreover, individuals often
submit to significant restrictions on their individual rights in order
to live in these communities, which makes the failure to recognize
loss of communality even more acute.
Second, because of the way in which takings (in particular,
large-scale takings) can tear apart a community’s social fabric,
they are especially harmful to the ability of more cooperative CICs
to flourish. Due to the absence of remedies for communal harm,
these communities’ ability to continue functioning postexpropriation is jeopardized. Thus the current takings scheme
harms cooperative communities more than individualistic ones
(which by nature do not suffer the same extent of communal harm,
and whose members may be made whole through market value
compensation). Even among cooperative communities, some are
harmed more than others depending on how central cooperation is
to the community’s functioning and its members’ realization of a
shared conception of the good.42 These consequences are
unjustifiable to the extent we accept these communities as
legitimate.
B. The Problem of Measuring a CIC’s Level of
Communality
A CIC’s legal form is a poor proxy for its actual nature.
Current property law is devoid of legal structures that relate to the
characteristics of CICs. This may be explained by the state’s desire
to maintain neutrality with respect to an owner’s choice of
residential arrangement. This neutrality, however, prevents us from
using a CIC’s legal structure to assess whether it or its members
should be compensated differently. While all CICs are
characterized by some degree of cooperation, the structure of the
CIC does not—in and of itself—reveal much about the communal
or individualistic nature of the community. Consider the following
three CICs, all of which operate as residential cooperatives.
42

For a discussion of the different roles of cooperation in a community’s
members’ realization of a shared conception of the good, see infra Part II.
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1. The Ritz Tower, New York, NY
The Ritz Tower (hereinafter The Ritz) was built in Manhattan
in 1925 as an elegant apartment hotel.43 In 1952, after a bank took
over the property due to discontinued mortgage payments, the
Sonnabend hotel chain bought the Ritz and converted the building
into a housing cooperative.44 The Ritz cooperative is operated in
accordance with its enumerated bylaws, and the board of directors
publishes, from time to time, various guidelines and notices that
bind all shareholders.45 The Ritz does not attempt to establish a
tightly bound community of residents. Rather, it offers its residents
“the privacy and security of a truly luxury residence.”46 And yet, it
is incorporated as a residential cooperative.
2. Acorn Community, Mineral, VA
Acorn Community is a secular, egalitarian community that was
founded in Virginia in 1993. It is “committed to income-sharing,
sustainable living, and creating a vibrant, eclectic culture.”47 In
Acorn, the members live on the same plot of land and manage the
community’s seed business together.48 According to Acorn’s
mission statement, the community members are expected to share
their “land, labor, income, and other resources equally or according
to need.”49 Another one of Acorn’s main goals is to keep its
43

See VIRGINIA KURSHAN, NEW YORK CITY LANDMARKS PRESERVATION
COMMISSION, Landmarks Commission Report (Oct. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.theritztower.com/unprotected/pdf/ritztower-landmark.pdf.
44
Id. at 7.
45
See, e.g., Notice from Ritz Tower Board of Directors to Shareholders
(Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.theritztower.com/unprotected/
pdf/alteration-agreement.pdf; Ritz Tower, Apartment Decoration Agreement
(July
2010),
available
at
http://www.theritztower.com/unprotected/
pdf/decorating-agreement.pdf.
46
See RITZ TOWER, http://www.theritztower.com/about-amenities.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
47
About Us, ACORN COMMUNITY, http://www.acorncommunity.org/ (last
visited Sept. 15, 2014).
48
Id.
49
A.C.O.R.N.,
ECOVILLAGE
CHARLOTTESVILLE,
http://www.
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members safe from violence and threats. The community
“encourages personal responsibility, supports queer and alternative
lifestyles, and strives to create a stimulating social, political,
feminist, and intellectual environment.”50 Community members
meet twice a week in order to discuss community issues and check
in with each other.51 Decisions in Acorn Community are made by
formal consensus.52 Legally, Acorn is the same as the Ritz—a
residential cooperative.
3. Woodcrest, Rifton, NY
The Woodcrest is a community founded by the Bruderhof—an
international communal movement that seeks to “put into action
Christ’s command to love God and neighbor.”53 Woodcrest, the
first Bruderhof community in the United States, opened in 1954 on
a property near the Walkill River in Rifton, New York.54 As part of
the Bruderhof movement, Woodcrest members believe that
community life gives them daily opportunities to put their beliefs
into action.55 The community members take lifetime vows of
obedience and poverty. Anyone who wishes to become a member
of any Bruderhof community gives away his or her personal
property before joining, and “contributes his or her talents to stand
on an equal footing with all brothers and sisters.”56 The Bruderhof
communities ascribe great importance to the institution of family
and regard marriage as a “lifelong, sacred commitment between
one man and one woman.”57 “Parents have the primary
greaterstonehenge.org/author/lgadmin/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
50
Acorn Community, FELLOWSHIP FOR INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY,
http://directory.ic.org/1933/Acorn_Community (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
51
About Us, supra note 47.
52
Id.
53
BRUDERHOF, http://www.bruderhof.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
54
YAACOV OVED, THE WITNESS OF THE BROTHERS: A HISTORY OF THE
BRUDERHOF 180–85 (Anthony Berris trans., Transaction Publishers) (2013).
55
BRUDERHOF, supra note 53.
56
Id.
57
OVED, supra note 54, at 51 (“We keep strict discipline in our family
life. Family does not suffer from the communal life, on the contrary; the joy of a
married couple in each other and in their children is especially strong and
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responsibility to raise their children, although the community
provides childcare and schooling from an early age.”58 Yet, the
Woodcrest is legally a residential cooperative, just like the Ritz
and Acorn.
These three communities illustrate the broad range of interests
and objectives that CICs pursue. They also demonstrate the formsubstance gap that characterizes CICs. The individualistic and
exclusive character of the Ritz contrasts starkly with the strong
communal characteristics of the Acorn Community and the holistic
spiritual worldview that binds members of Woodcrest together.
Likewise, the secular nature of Acorn Community is at odds with
Woodcrest’s deeply religious foundation.
Despite these substantive differences—some of which go to the
root of each CIC’s existence—each community is free to establish
itself as either a homeowners’ association, condominium, or
cooperative. These three types of developments are in some ways
distinct.59 The internal governance of these developments might be
influenced by their different financial structures,60 but they all
deep.”).
58

BRUDERHOF, supra note 53.
See McKenzie, Common-Interest Housing, supra note 4, at 205 (“There
are also significant differences among the three types of CIDs. Condominium
developments are typically multifamily construction resembling one or more
apartment or townhouse buildings. Each home buyer acquires ownership of an
individual unit, consisting of the airspace within the walls, coupled with a
fractional interest in the ownership of the entire building. The condominium
association manages and maintains the building. Cooperatives give each owner a
share interest in the building or buildings, along with the exclusive right to
occupy a particular unit. The cooperative association often has the right to
approve the sale of units and may interview prospective owners before granting
them the right to purchase. Planned communities may include mixes of housing
types but typically feature detached single-family homes with their own lawns
and driveways, along with common areas such as private streets; recreation
facilities such as golf courses, swimming pools, and lakes; and other facilities
such as sewer and drainage systems, and parking areas. In such developments,
the purchaser acquires ownership of one of the homes, as well as an interest in
the association that owns and maintains the common areas.”).
60
See Michael H. Schill, Ioan Voicu & Jonathan Miller, The
Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in
New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 281 (2007).
59
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share a prominent feature: the governing body has wide leeway to
shape and restrict members’ property rights.61 While the choice of
legal form affects the scope of private ownership, it does not reveal
much about the characteristics of the community. The legal
structures do not dictate the form of cooperation in which members
must engage. Instead, each one may accommodate forms of
cooperation that vary in purpose and scope.
As discussed, CICs take numerous forms, with condominiums,
homeowners associations and housing cooperatives being the most
prevalent. A decision to purchase property in any CIC is likely to
subject the purchaser to a set of obligations toward other members
and the association, which may shape the contours of the owner’s
property rights in different ways.62 However, none of the
recognized forms of CICs have inherent sets of obligations.63
61

See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275,
1282 (Cal. 1994) (“[S]ubordination of individual property rights to the collective
judgment of the owners association together with restrictions on the use of real
property comprise the chief attributes of owning property in a common interest
development.”); Brower, supra note 16, at 211 (“[R]egardless of the legal form
of the residential association, the associations govern their residents by private
law mechanisms premised on a contractual, bargain-based paradigm, such as
covenants, equitable servitudes, corporate by-laws and charters, and trust
declarations.”); Schill et al., supra note 60, at 281 (“Both condominium
associations and cooperative corporations enact rules that govern the behavior of
their residents.”).
62
See Brower, supra note 16, at 210–11.
63
Michael H. Schill, Ioan Voicu, and Jonathan Miller argue the opposite,
at least in regard to cooperatives and condominiums: “[U]nlike the case of
cooperative apartments, condominium owners do not effectively share liability
on mortgage debt, they are free to transfer their apartments to whomever they
choose, they are subject to fewer rules than cooperative apartment owners and,
correspondingly, they need spend less time in internal governance.” Schill et al,
supra note 60, at 276. However, while differences in financial governance may
affect the scope of owners’ property rights, such differences are not the result of
any legal requirements. Thus, even though they claim that cooperatives have a
stricter regime for the alienation of property, the alienation of property in
condominiums may also be contingent upon the approval of the admissions
committee or other conditions laid out in the CC&Rs. Id. at 313. See also
Brower, supra note 16, at 210 (arguing that the form of residential property
ownership is of minimal importance); Jonathan D. Ross-Harrington, Property
Forms in Tension: Preference Inefficiency, Rent-Seeking, and the Problem of
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Considered in isolation, an individual’s choice of a condominium,
homeowners association, or housing cooperative tells us little
about the contours of her property rights or obligations to the
community.
The Ritz example may best illustrate this problem. The Ritz, as
mentioned, is a residential cooperative. While cooperatives have
long been recognized as a means of providing affordable
housing,64 the Ritz proves that they are used for other purposes as
well. Among the types of CICs mentioned above, cooperatives are
often seen as the most collaborative.65 And yet, cooperation among
residents of the Ritz does not run any deeper than sharing
operating costs and respecting each other’s use and enjoyment of
their living spaces and common amenities. The Ritz residents do
not share a deep or collective conception of the good—they do not
live together for the purpose of realizing certain fundamental
values. Indeed, many of the Ritz’s residents probably do not even
know each other.
The use of the legal structure of a cooperative, therefore,
carries little, if any, substantive meaning. The choice of a certain
type of CIC does not necessarily imply anything about the extent
of the cooperation, its purposes or its degree of importance for
members of the CIC. While the law offers property owners a
Notice in the Modern Condominium, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 192 (2009)
(“Condominiums, like all common-interest communities, are distinguished by
their complex system of servitudes and the governance structure designed to
amend and enforce the applicable covenants. Condominiums are governed by an
association, membership in which is a mandatory condition of purchasing a unit
in the condominium community. Unlike a single-family homeowner who
exercises complete control over her real property, owners in a condominium are
subject in many respects to the collective will of the association. Condominium
associations have the power to assess fees, set restrictions on the use and
enjoyment of property, and enforce community rules and standards.”).
64
See Gerald W. Sazama, Lessons from the History of Affordable Housing
Cooperatives in the United States: A Case Study in American Affordable
Housing Policy, 59 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 573, 573–74 (2000).
65
See SINGER, supra note 13, at 826; Fenster, supra note 4, at 21 (“In
some ways, the cooperative form would seem more ideologically amenable to
cohousing because it combines the common ownership of the land and
improvements (including the common house and residential units) with a
shareholder ownership interest and proprietary leases for residents.”).
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variety of legal structures, these structures are quite hollow. Thus,
within takings law, these legal structures cannot be relied upon to
determine when additional remedies that redress loss of
communality should apply. The following Parts will therefore
outline a different way of making this assessment.
II.

GUIDELINES FOR A REFORM: WHICH COMMUNITIES AND
INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL
REMEDIES?

In fulfilling its pluralistic obligation, the state should enable its
citizens to realize their own conceptions of the good by offering
them a sufficiently wide range of meaningful legal institutions.
Insofar as we believe that “structuring our geographic localities
into . . . local communities fulfills an important human need and
facilitates the pursuit of worthy civic virtues, we need to
incorporate this vision into our legal rules.”66 The aim of this Part
is to offer guidelines for implementing a reform in takings law that
is tied to this vision and recognizes the value of community in
property.
The application of a state’s pluralistic obligation to a given
community should depend on that community’s characteristics.
This Part therefore argues that the state should take into account
three factors in determining the treatment of CICs in takings law:
(1) the nature of community members’ cooperation, i.e., its
relationship with members’ realization of a shared conception of
the good; (2) the community’s “social legitimacy”; and (3) the
community’s need for state support to stay intact. In assessing
these factors, the state should ensure that the benefits of the reform
are limited to socially legitimate communities that engage in
sufficiently meaningful cooperation.
A. The Nature of a Community’s Cooperation
Strictly speaking, community as a property value represents
cooperation of two or more persons who are jointly involved in an
asset. However, not all cooperation should be recognized as
66

DAGAN, supra note 8, at 106.

TAKINGS, COMMUNITY, AND VALUE

161

expressing the value of community in property. Instead, for a
community’s cooperation to be sufficiently meaningful, it must be
founded upon a conception of the good that promotes norms of
cooperation rather than separation, exclusion, or individualism.
Property owners interact in different ways and to reach different
goals. Yet, not all types of cooperation among neighboring
property owners should be regarded as expressing the value of
community in property for the purposes of a reformed takings
regime.
Recognition of cooperation in property law should not be
dependent on the cooperators’ motivations, but rather on the role
such cooperation plays in ensuring pluralism. Gregory Alexander
argues that a foundational pluralistic conception of property67
actually entails multiple levels of pluralism in our approach to
values and goods—a “pluralism of pluralisms.”68 One level entails
recognition of the legitimacy of a variety of different conceptions
of the good. The second level refers to the methods by which
individuals may realize their conceptions of the good. On this
level, while cooperation may not be an inherent feature of a
conception of the good, people who adhere to that conception may
still need to cooperate in order to effectively realize it. For
example, American Jews often prefer to live in neighborhoods
where there are at least a few other Jews, since the presence of
other Jews ensures the existence of common religious
institutions.69 Although cooperation itself may not be a religious
commandment, religious people may find that cooperating with
others of the same faith facilitates their ability to realize their
conception of the good. Should such cooperation be regarded as
expressing the value of community in property? If we embrace
foundational pluralism, the answer is yes. Foundational pluralism

67

ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 14–15.
Alexander, supra note 10, at 1036.
69
See Amitai Etzioni, The Ghetto—A Re-Evaluation, 37 SOC. FORCES
255, 259 (1958) (“The reasons for the lower limit [of Jews within an area] may
be that [Jews] prefer to not live in an area in which there is no synagogue, no
Jewish Sunday school, no opportunity to have Jewish friends and potential
Jewish marriage partners for their children.”).
68
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posits that pluralism exists all the way down.70 Accordingly,
property law, and takings law in particular, should accommodate
the value of community both in cases where cooperation is
inherent to the cooperators’ shared conception of the good71 and in
cases where cooperation is extrinsic, that is, only a means for
realizing a conception of the good.
However, recognition of even extrinsic cooperation as
expressing the value of the community in property may lead to the
conclusion that any loss of cooperation between neighbors should
be compensable in takings law. Such broad recognition of
neighborly collaboration leaves us in the current scenario where no
distinctions exist between communities based on the forms and
functions of their cooperation. Therefore, this Part offers a twostage analysis in order to determine whether a specific form of
cooperation should be recognized as expressing the value of
community in property, and to what extent this should affect the
legal treatment it receives.
1. Stage One: Verifying a Shared Conception of the
Good
Under the proposed regime, the first step is to decide whether
cooperation exists, which is very likely the case for any CIC. The
next step is to determine if that cooperation is meaningful.
Cooperation is “meaningful” if (1) it is directed toward the
realization of a shared conception of the good; and (2) it is not
founded on individualistic and exclusionary norms or values that
fail to contribute to a sense of community.
Although there are differing views with respect to the proper
content of a conception of the good,72 for the purposes of this
70

Alexander, supra note 10, at 1020–21. See also Mason, supra note 9.
Consider, for example, the Israeli kibbutz, in which the shared
conception of the good calls for ongoing cooperation.
72
See, e.g., JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 81–97
(1982) (presenting a list of the basic aspects of human well-being); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH
4–15, 76–96 (2001) (presenting a list of central human capabilities and their
relation to humans’ conceptions of the good); ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 31–36 (2011) (reviewing several
71
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proposal, there is no need to choose one in particular. John Rawls’s
definition may be best: a definition of the good should consist “of a
more or less determined scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want
to realize for their own sake.”73 Therefore, for the purposes of this
first-stage examination, a conception of the good need only have
the ultimate goal of fulfilling the conditions deemed necessary for
a valuable and worthwhile life.74 Such conceptions are many and
diverse.75 They may have different characteristics: economic,
social, cultural, religious, and may also differ in their
comprehensiveness. While some might infuse every aspect of life,
others may be less sweeping.76 At this stage, no normative
judgments regarding conceptions of good are required.
But if we accept any conception of the good as a legitimate
end, what cooperation would not be recognized as meaningful?
The answer is twofold: first, cooperation that does not promote a
conception of the good, and second, cooperation that promotes a
conception of the good but does not express or promote the value
of community.
To illustrate, consider gated communities. Scott E.
Nonnemaker conducted thorough research about life in three gated
communities in New Tampa, Florida.77 Nonnemaker’s findings
show that the owners in the Arbor Greene, Hunter’s Green, and
Grand Hampton gated communities were motivated to purchase
property in these communities not because of their search for
social interaction with their neighbors, but rather because of their
approaches to the definition of “the good” and concluding that all approaches
alike rely on a description of human nature, of the human experience and of
human universality in formulating their respective lists of goods); Joseph Chan,
Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 10–16
(2000) (arguing that a conception of “the good” may refer to judgments not only
of a person’s life, but also specific activities, values, experiences and states of
affairs).
73
See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 19.
74
JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION 2 (2011).
75
RAWLS, supra note 11, at 19–20.
76
Id. at 13–14, 19–20. See also QUONG, supra note 74, at 13–14.
77
Scott E. Nonnemaker, Living Behind Bars?: An Investigation of Gated
Communities in New Tampa, Florida (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
University of South Florida) (on file with University of South Florida).
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desire for security and high property values.78 Searching for some
evidence of communality, Nonnemaker asked these gated
communities’ members whether they perceive their relationship
with their co-members as cohabitation or as a community.79 An
owner in Hunter’s Green answered:
I can’t even tell you what my neighbor look like
barely [sic]. Talk to one guy across the street once
in a while . . . we tried the ‘neighbor’ thing in other
areas, but it wasn’t for us. We prefer our home and
keeping to ourselves . . . it’s a cohabitation . . .
simply just an economic arrangement between me
and them.80
Arbor Greene, Hunter’s Green, and Grand Hampton are far
from unique. Empirical studies reveal that the search for
communality is often a secondary, if not tertiary, consideration for
owners in gated communities.81 Blakely and Snyder argue that
gated community owners often seek to cooperate to maintain their
high home values and to reduce crime in the surrounding area, but
for little else.82
78

Id. at ix.
Id. at 129.
80
Id. at 129–30.
81
See SARAH BLANDY ET AL., GATED COMMUNITIES: A SYSTEMATIC
REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH EVIDENCE, 24–27 (ESRC Centre for Neighborhood
Research, U.K. 2003) (summarizing several empirical studies which were
conducted in gated communities in the United State showing that the community
life and interaction with neighbors in such communities were low); Edward J.
Blakely & Mary Gail Snyder, Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities
in the United States, in ARCHITECTURE OF FEAR 85, 89–90 (Nan Ellin, ed.,
1997) (classifying gated communities into three categories: lifestyle, elite, and
security zone, and arguing that in all three types the search for communality
plays only a secondary or tertiary role in owners’ decision of purchase).
82
See, e.g., EDWARD JAMES BLAKELEY, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 15-18 (1999); Blakely & Snyder, supra
note 81, at 90; B LANDY ET AL ., supra note 81, at 2 (“It would appear that gated
communities are not self-evidently attractive places to live. Existing research
showed that motivations for living in a gated community are primarily driven by
the need for security and a more generalized fear of crime.”); Gary T. Marx, The
Engineering of Social Control: The Search for the Silver Bullet, in CRIME AND
INEQUALITY 225, 231–39 (John G. Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995).
79
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Should such cooperation be entitled to different legal treatment
than that applied to fee simple ownership? The answer is no, for
two reasons. First, such gated communities do not promote any
distinct conception of the good insofar as security and monetary
property values are commonplace ideals. And second, even if we
are to assume that such gated communities do cooperate in pursuit
of a conception of the good, the conception should not be entitled
to different legal treatment because it fails to express the
community’s distinct value.
Gated communities are primarily a locus of seclusion and
segregation for the wealthy.83 Membership in such communities
does not depend on a commitment to a shared notion of the good,
but rather on members’ ability to pay for the services provided to
them, services that are generally supposed to be of higher quality
than those local governments provide to the general population.84 It
should come as no surprise then that “[c]ontrary to popular claims,
studies show that [gated communities] are associated with low
community participation and cohesion.”85 The difference, then,
between life inside the gates of such communities and that of the
population at large is a difference of degree, not of kind.86
Cooperation among members is designed to reduce the costs
83

BLAKELEY, supra note 82, at 8. See also Blandy et al, supra note 81, at
2 (“Importantly there was no apparent desire to come into contact with the
‘community’ within the gated or walled area.”); Amnon Lehavi, How Property
Can Create, Maintain, or Destroy Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
43, 58–59 (2009) (questioning the existence of a shared conception of the good
in such communities); Evan McKenzie, Constructing the Pomerium in Las
Vegas: A Case Study of Emerging Trends in American Gated Communities, 20
HOUSING STUD. 187, 187–92 (2005).
84
See Elena Vesselinov & William Falk, Gated Communities and Spatial
Inequality, 29 J. URB. AFF. 109, 110–112, 118–19 (2007).
85
Id. at 119.
86
The distinction between qualitative and quantitative differences
suggests that the things valued by gated communities’ members are not unique
but, instead, are shared by the entire population. People who live outside the
gates of such communities also regard personal security as an important feature
of a valued life and, just like gated communities’ members, will also seek to
maintain their assets’ value. Therefore, personal security or the will to preserve
an asset’s value should not be considered as part of a conception of the good that
requires cooperation.
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associated with obtaining high quality services by pooling
members’ financial resources together. There is no shared
conception of the good that is unique to gated community owners.
But even if we assume that a gated community shares a
conception of the good, the ultimate outcome of the analysis would
be no different. Gated communities are generally designed to be a
“villa in the jungle,” offering their members a peaceful and
trouble-free life.87 In order to realize this conception of the good,
members of gated communities cooperate only in order to exclude
non-members and ensure their own independence, safety, and
property values. In other words, a gated community’s shared
conception of the good is centered on isolation and low social
cohesion. Such a conception of the good—even if it can be
established as a genuine conception of the good—should not be
entitled to remedies for communal loss.88
2. Stage Two: Classifying the Role of a Community’s
Cooperation
Assuming a legitimate conception of the good is identified in
the first stage of the examination—be it religious, economic,
cultural or otherwise—the next step is to determine the role of
cooperation in the community’s ability to realize that good. Simply
put, the more significant the role cooperation plays in community
members’ ability to realize their shared conception of the good, the
greater the justification for deviating from takings law’s existing
remedy formula. When cooperation plays only a marginal or
87

BLAKELEY, supra note 82, at 15–18.
It is important, however, to emphasize that denying gated communities
remedies for loss of communality in the law of takings does not deny their right
to exist; a foundational pluralistic conception of property legitimizes
individualistic conceptions of the good no less than it legitimizes conceptions
that are built on cooperation. However, members of the type of gated
community described above do not see the community as having value in itself,
but rather seek to ensure that the internal governance of the community causes
as little harm as possible to their individual property rights, and would likely
refuse to subject themselves to a demanding set of obligations during their
membership in the community. They should therefore not be entitled to
additional compensation if the state expropriates their land.
88
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secondary role, the law should only be sensitive to the existence of
such cooperation or moderately support it. On the other hand, if the
cooperation is crucial to a community’s realization of its
conception of the good, remedies should be available that are
oriented towards its preservation.
In order to identify the role of cooperation in a community’s
realization of its conception of the good, this Part proposes three
distinct categories: (1) constitutive cooperation; (2) value-adding
cooperation; and (3) facilitative cooperation. Cooperation is
constitutive if it is an inherent and vital feature of the conception of
the good—not only an instrument for the realization of the
conception of the good, but as an end unto itself. An example of
constitutive cooperation can be found in the historic Israeli
kibbutz. Within this setting, cooperation serves both as an aspect of
the desired good and as an instrument for its achievement. Israeli
law defines a kibbutz as “a free association of people for the
purposes of settlement, absorption of new immigrants,
maintenance of a cooperative society based on community
ownership of property, self-sufficiency in labor, equality and
cooperation in all areas of production, consumption and
education.”89 Property scholar Avital Margalit explains that “the
kibbutz is an exemplary and equitable way of communal living for
people who believe in the ideals of equality, brotherhood and
mutual assistance.”90 Cooperation, then, not only enables the
community to function properly, but is one of the essential
elements of the good itself.
Other instances of cooperation may simply facilitate a group’s
ability to realize its shared conception of the good without being an
indispensable part of the conception. Consider the House of
Commons community in Austin, Texas. The House of Commons
community is a residential cooperative and part of the University
of Texas Inter-Cooperative Council, a non-profit student housing

89

Cooperative Societies Ordinance (Types of Societies), 5756–1995,
5722 LSI 244 (1995) (Isr.) (emphasis added).
90
Avital Margalit, Commons and Legality, in PROPERTY AND
COMMUNITY 141, 159 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds.,
2010).
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organization, which focuses on vegan and vegetarian lifestyles.91
The community only serves meals that are vegan or vegetarian.92
The house purchases almost nothing except organic food, and meat
is not allowed on the property.93 Although veganism has become a
common way of life for many people who live outside a defined
geographic communal setting,94 vegans may still encounter
difficulties as they seek to live according to their beliefs. For
instance, they may discover that local grocery stores do not sell
many products they can eat. They may find themselves forced to
work in businesses that do not respect their way of life, and they
may have to ask restaurant staff to accommodate their dietary
restrictions. If a group of vegans unite in order to form a vegan
community, a significant portion of these difficulties are likely to
be resolved. It would be easier for vegans to live in a community
where the shops and businesses cater to their lifestyles, relieving
them of the burden of finding acceptable foods and of the need to
ask about the ingredients in the food they consume. Accordingly,
though it may be possible for the members of the House of
Commons to live as vegans while living next to non-vegans, the
supportive surroundings they gain within the community facilitate
each individual’s ability to practice veganism.
Finally, cooperation may be neither constitutive nor
facilitative, but “value-adding.” This type of cooperation, although
not an essential element of the good itself, is nevertheless much
more than an instrument to assist in its realization. Such “valueadding” cooperation may bring about a qualitative change in a
community’s realization of its shared conception of the good.
Cooperation should be regarded as value-adding if, considering the
group’s values, joint activity has more value than individual
activity. For example, ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities promote
91

House of Commons, HOUS. OF COMMONS STUDENT HOUSING COOP.,
http://www.iccaustin.coop/hoc/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
A 2012 Gallup poll discovered that five percent of American adults
consider themselves to be vegetarians and two percent consider themselves to be
vegans. Frank Newport, In U.S., 5% Consider Themselves Vegetarians, GALLUP
(July 26, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/156215/consider-themselvesvegetarians.aspx.
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their vision of the good through observance of Judaism’s
commandments and laws.95 Members of such communities
cooperate on different levels, such as ensuring the existence of
synagogues and establishing educational institutions that promote
religious studies. While cooperation plays a significant role in the
functioning of ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities, however, it
nevertheless cannot be regarded as constitutive. Jews can fulfill
their religion’s commandments and laws without being a member
of a geographic religious community. But, as provided by Jewish
law, cooperation not only makes it easier for individuals to realize
their conception of the good, but adds significant value and
meaning to its realization. For example, a Jewish person is
commanded to pray three times on an average day. A Jewish
person may fulfill this religious commandment by praying alone,
but Jewish law urges men to always pray in a quorum of at least
ten.96 Thus, Orthodox Jewish Communities derive a very tangible
95

Jewish ultra-Orthodox communities are common within the New York
area. Communities such as Kiryas Joel (a village within the town
of Monroe in Orange County, New York, where the great majority of residents
are Hasidic Jews who strictly observe the Torah and its commandments, and
belong to the worldwide Satmar Hasidic dynasty) and the ultra-Orthodox
communities of Williamsburg in Brooklyn maintain a lively community life and
offer their residents a variety of religious institutions, religious services and
networks of mutual support. For more on the Kiryas Joel community, see Abner
S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1996); Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM L. REV.
104 (1996). Also see the Kiryas Joel community’s website, KIRYAS JOEL VOICE,
http://www.kjvoice.com/default.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). For more on
the ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities of Williamsburg, generally see GEORGE
KRANZLER, HASIDIC WILLIAMSBURG: A CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HASIDIC
COMMUNITY (1995).
96
I would like to demonstrate the additional value of joint action
according to the Jewish religion with two short (and non-exhaustive) examples.
The first involves the commandment of praying—a Jewish person is
commanded to pray three times a day (except on the Sabbath and religious
holidays, when there are additional prayers). A Jewish person may fulfill the
religious commandment of praying by praying alone (except for specific prayers
which are subject to a quorum of 10 men). However, the code of Jewish law
urges people to always pray in a quorum of at least 10 men (Minyan). According
to the code of Jewish law, by joining nine other Jewish men, the value of the
prayer increases and it now contains a different, and more valuable, set of
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benefit in relation to their conception of the good if the community
is geographically concentrated.
In light of this classification of the roles that cooperation can
play in community members’ ability to realize conceptions of the
good, reconsider the three communities discussed in Part I.
Cooperation plays a constitutive role in the Bruderhof
community’s ability to realize its members’ shared conception of
the good. In order to fulfill the Bruderhof movement’s ideals, a
member in each of the Bruderhof communities should “take
lifetime vows of obedience and poverty and [] contribute his or her
talents to stand on an equal footing with all brothers and sisters.”97
The same is true for the Acorn community. While the Acorn
members do not share a religious conception of the good, they
nevertheless share an economic one. Quite similar to the Israeli
historic kibbutz, the Acorn community members believe in
income-sharing, where their members are expected to share their
land, labor, income and other resources equally or according to
need.98 As in the case of the historic Israeli Kibbutz, an individual
cannot fulfill such an economic conception of the good alone.
features and virtues. See S HULCHAN A RUCH 90:9 (“One should attempt to pray
at a synagogue with the public. And if he cannot, he should pray at the time that
the public prays.”). Rabbi Moses of Coucy (one of the Shulchan Aruch’s
interpreters) argues that this also applies to communities in which there is no
Minyan. The second example involves the commandment of reading the book of
Esther (Megillah) on the Jewish holiday of Purim. The code of Jewish law states
that a Jewish person is obligated to read the book of Esther on the eve of the
Purim holiday and to reread it the next day. However, the code also states that
“[t]he most desirable way to fulfill the commandment” is to perform the reading
in public. Therefore, while a Jewish person can fulfill their religious
commandments privately, such fulfillment has a different, elevated value when
they cooperate with others. For a summary of the code of Jewish law on this
matter, see K ITZUR S HULCHAN A RUCH 141:9 (“The most desirable way to
fulfill the commandment is to hear the reading of the Megillah in a
synagogue, where there are many people, because ’within the multitude of the
people is the glory of the King.’ At the very least, one should take care to hear it
in a ‘Minyan’ of ten. If it is impossible to read it with a ‘Minyan,’ each
individual should read it from a kosher scroll, with the saying of the blessings
beforehand.”).
97
BRUDERHOF, supra note 53.
98
See About Us, supra note 47.
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But what about the Ritz? Does the cooperation between
members of this housing cooperative fit within any one of the
above-mentioned roles of cooperation? The answer,
unsurprisingly, is no. As mentioned earlier, the Ritz residents,
similar to the Hunter’s Green gated community members, seek
only the least amount of cooperation necessary with their comembers.99 Therefore, the Ritz fails the first stage examination.
Yet, even if we were to acknowledge that the Ritz community’s
search for a luxurious and private lifestyle embodies a conception
of the good, we might still question whether realization of this
lifestyle requires cooperation. As in Tampa’s gated
communities,100 members themselves would probably answer in
the negative.
This classification of the potential roles of cooperation in a
community’s members’ realization of their shared conception of
the good provides us with an instrument for distinguishing among
CICs based upon their actual characteristics. Therefore, it can be
used as a basis for determining the type of legal remedies a
community should receive when the government takes its property
through eminent domain.
B. Social Legitimacy
Embracing a foundational pluralistic conception of property
runs the risk of enabling—or signaling state endorsement of—
communities that abide by norms that explicitly or implicitly
enforce racial, socio-economic or religious discrimination, or other
illiberal norms.101 Because a foundational pluralistic conception of
property regards property as a social instrument that should enable
people to fulfill diverse views of what constitutes a valuable and
meaningful life, an assessment of any property arrangement cannot

99

See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
101
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 10, at 1126; Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism
and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1431–33 (2012);
Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Return of the Repressed: Illiberal Groups in a Liberal
State,12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 897 (2001-2002).
100
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be detached from prevailing social norms that promote diversity.102
After all, the core assertion of foundational pluralism is that
diversity generally promotes human flourishing.103
The previous section discussed general categories of
cooperation that may entitle members of a community to additional
legal remedies when the government takes their property,
consistent with the state’s pluralistic obligation to allow diverse
communities (and not only individualistic communities) to survive
and flourish. This first stage looks only at whether a community’s
members share a conception of the good and, if so, how they
cooperate to achieve that good. The inquiry, however, does not end
there. The next stage—an assessment of a community’s social
legitimacy—entails a normative evaluation of the community.
Foundational pluralism imposes on the state an obligation to
embrace diversity with the goal of promoting human flourishing.
Thus, the social legitimacy test operates as a check on the
unintended harmful effects that may result from compensating a
loss of communality in communities whose existence is antithetical
to this goal. As demonstrated below, however, this normative
evaluation is limited—it is designed to avoid judgment of a
community’s internal practices and to instead focus on a
community’s structural openness.
Consider the Woodcrest community for example. As part of the
international Bruderhof movement, the Woodcrest community is a
Christian community that strictly regulates all forms of conduct,
belief, appearance, dress and demeanor, with particular emphasis
upon the repression of premarital or extramarital sexual
expression.104 Some might consider these regulations to be
violations of conventional liberal norms.105 Julius H. Rubin, for
102

See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV . 745, 757 (2009).
103
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In
Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992).
104
Julius H. Rubin, Contested Narratives: A Case Study of the Conflict
between a New Religious Movement and its Critics, in MISUNDERSTANDING
CULTS: SEARCHING FOR OBJECTIVITY IN A CONTROVERSIAL FIELD 452, 454
(Benjamin Zablocki & Thomas Robbins eds., 2001).
105
See, e.g., Gerald Renner, Bruderhof Leader Defends Close-knit
Community Against Outside Critics, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 12, 1995,
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example, points to the community’s gender inequality practices,
arguing that “[y]oung women confront the issues of powerlessness
and gender inequality in spiritual and temporal roles, and severe
limits are placed upon their aspirations and participation in the
community.”106 Yet, should a liberal state deny such a community
the right to exist or provide it less support? Or should such a
community—which fosters and even enforces illiberal norms
within its boundaries—be entitled to additional remedies in takings
law for the loss of communality?
A liberal state may respond in three ways. First, it may deny
illiberal communities any state support. Second, it may condition
its support on the community’s compliance with a state’s defined
liberal minimum requirements (LMRs).107 Finally, the state, if it
takes its pluralistic obligation seriously, may seek to use another,
less normatively charged method of inquiry to determine a
community’s social legitimacy.
This third approach is available—and even superior to—the
two alternate options. Instead of determining compliance with
LMRs or cutting off all support, the state should inquire into how
open a community is to allowing its members to join other
communities simultaneously, referred to here as multiple
community belonging (MCB), and should inquire into LMRs only
as a last resort if the MCB inquiry is inconclusive. This solution is
based on a sociological redefinition of community that occurred in
the last century, which highlighted most communities’ loss of
exclusive dominion over all aspects of members’ lives.108 A
available
at
http://articles.courant.com/1995-11-12/news/9511120143_1_
bruderhof-communes-mennonites (“The movement has also been garnering a
growing chorus of critics in recent years, including academics who say the
leaders shut them out, and former members who complain they are not allowed
to visit their relatives”).
106
Rubin, supra note 104, at 457.
107
See STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION
IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 188–211 (2000).
108
See, e.g., BARRY WELLMAN, NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE:
LIFE IN CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITIES 2–3 (1999); Barry Wellman, The
Community Question, 84 AM. J. SOC. 1201 (1979); Barry Wellman et al.,
Networks as Personal Communities, in, SOCIAL STRUCTURES: A NETWORK
APPROACH 130, 133–35 (Barry Wellman & Stephen D. Berkowitz eds., 1988).
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sociological inquiry into community and its role in the last century
is the subject of an enormous amount of sociological literature and
is beyond the scope of this Article.109 It is sufficient, however, to
recognize German sociologist Georg Simmel’s observation that
modern society functions as a web of group affiliations, in which
every person becomes a member of several social groups
simultaneously.110 This multiple belonging ensures a space of
freedom for the individual, since one is no longer restricted to one
all-encompassing community.111 Instead, the individual is allowed
to maintain her participation in multiple groups, to preserve her
connections with other individuals, and to participate in different
modes of cooperation.112
109

See, e.g., ANTHONY PAUL COHEN, BELONGING: IDENTITY AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION IN BRITISH RURAL CULTURES 1–4 (1982); COLIN BELL &
HOWARD NEWBY, COMMUNITY STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY
OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY 252 (1971); ROBERT NISBET, THE QUEST FOR
COMMUNITY: A STUDY IN THE ETHICS OF ORDER AND FREEDOM 47 (2010);
George A. Hillery, Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement, 20 RURAL
SOC’Y 111 (1955).
110
GEORGE SIMMEL, CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS
150 (1955) (“The modern pattern differs sharply from the concentric pattern of
group affiliation as far as a person’s achievements are concerned. Today
someone may belong, aside from his occupational position, to a scientific
association, he may sit on a board of directors of a corporation and occupy an
honorific position in the city government.”).
111
Id. at 130 (“In general, this type of development tends to enlarge the
sphere of freedom: not because the affiliation with, and the dependence on
groups, has been abandoned, but because it has become a matter of choice with
whom one affiliates and upon whom one is dependent.”).
112
Id. Morris Janowitz followed Simmel’s notion of multiple community
belonging. In what he termed “communities of limited liability,” Janowitz
argues that the communities of the modern age are characterized by their partial
role in their members’ lives and by the relatively low commitment of their
members. Therefore, Janowitz argues that “in a highly mobile society[,] people
may participate extensively in local institutions and develop community
attachments”; yet, due to its modern conception, the individual’s search for the
support of others is constrained by his resistance to being controlled by others.
These conflicting tendencies are the basis of contemporary communities, which
are, according to Janowitz, of “limited liability.” See John D. Kasarda and
Morris Janowitz, Community Attachment in Mass Society, 39 AM. SOC. REV.
328, 329 (1974).
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The ability of community members to engage with people from
outside their home community exposes them to different values
and norms. These unmediated encounters help facilitate
individuals’ abilities to reflect on their communities’ prevailing
norms. This situation leaves individuals with three possible
responses. Those who have been exposed to different sets of norms
than those prevailing in their community may decide to leave their
community since they no longer share its values; they may decide
to stay within the community and try to change it from the inside;
or, they may decide to stay and conform to community norms.
Since, in each case, an informed individual has made a choice, a
liberal state should respect the decision. The current social reality,
in which a person may belong simultaneously to more than one
community, thus significantly reduces the risk that an individual
will be oppressed by any particular community of which she is a
member.113 Furthermore, by engaging simultaneously in several
communities, individuals are no longer confined to a single, allencompassing community and enjoy a greater degree of
freedom.114 In the context of the modern diverse state, this
condition is normal and should be encouraged.
By focusing on communities’ structural openness, which
allows members to simultaneously belong to other communities,
the state may establish a policy for addressing illiberal
communities that is both liberal and pluralistic. An MCB test
simply asks whether an individual is allowed to occupy different
positions in different communities at the same time. If the answer
is yes, the community may be entitled to enhanced takings
remedies despite being superficially illiberal. While not entirely
eliminating questions concerning norms and values, the MCB test
sidesteps them to focus attention instead on community structure
and boundaries.
The MCB test is superior to the two alternatives presented
above for several reasons. First, in comparison with denying
illiberal communities additional takings remedies, the MCB test
commits the state to its pluralistic obligation to ensure a diverse
society in which different—sometimes radically different—
113
114

See SIMMEL, supra note 110, at 130.
Id.
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conceptions of the good may co-exist. Second, the MCB test will
reduce clashes between the liberal state and illiberal communities.
Such clashes are often a result of communities’ resistance to state
intervention into internal ethical conduct,115 and the MCB test
sidesteps any such direct intervention. The MCB’s structural
demand does not impinge on the community’s internal conduct,
and instead only requires it to give up the use of seclusion and
isolation as instruments for ensuring the preservation of its
conception of the good. Furthermore, protecting a community’s
internal conduct from state intervention may temper an illiberal
community’s tendency to block members from engaging with
outsiders.
Finally, the MCB test avoids the ambiguity inherent in LMRbased determinations. LMRs are determined by the government,
may be vague, and do not necessarily have identical content and
scope from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, while most
liberal governments use LMRs in setting children’s education
policy (usually by establishing an official core curriculum), the
scope of these requirements varies greatly across jurisdictions, as
do the implications of a community’s rejection of the state’s
requirements.116 This ambiguity leads to a lack of uniformity and
115

A recent legal clash involving the legitimacy of educational LMRs
occurred in Canada, where the Quebec education authorities ordered the transfer
of thirteen children from the Lev Tahor Jewish Ultra-Orthodox community to
foster care. See Lev Tahor Child Removal Order Upheld by Ontario Judge, CBC
NEWS,
(Feb.
3,
2014,
3:05
PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/
news/canada/montreal/lev-tahor-child-removal-order-upheld-by-ontario-judge1.2521639. The government alleged that the children—who are
homeschooled—did not know basic math, and some could not speak either
English or French. Id. In November 2014, approximately 250 Lev Tahor
adherents fled to Ontario from Quebec just ahead of the order to seize the
children. Id. The community’s move to Ontario was the result of the Quebec
government’s continuous intervention in the community’s internal conduct,
especially the educational authorities’ efforts to force the community to use a
secular curriculum for teaching its home-schooled children. Id. By moving to
Ontario, a province which is more tolerant of faith-based schooling and has been
a lure for other religious communities, the Lev Tahor community attempted to
regain control of its inner space. Id.
116
As the Lev Tahor case demonstrates, different jurisdictions may
embrace entirely different intervention policies, which affect the incentives of
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makes it difficult for states to monitor communities and enforce
their requirements.117 The MCB test overcomes these obstacles by
creating a simple and uniform test. In most situations, the
characteristics of the community in question will provide answers.
This is because all-encompassing communities rarely hide their
characteristics; on the contrary, they highlight their distinctiveness.
In more ambiguous cases, when the community may not hold itself
out as all-encompassing (perhaps out of a desire to avoid state
interference), the state may require the community to prove its
compliance with the MCB model by requiring presentation of
evidence and data as to its members’ participation in other
communities.
In the context of takings law reform, a conclusion about a
community’s social legitimacy should affect the community’s
entitlement to additional remedies for communal loss. As long as a
community allows MCB, it remains entitled to whatever benefits it
would receive otherwise. When a community does not allow MCB,
however, the state should investigate the reasons for the absence of
MCB. The state should determine whether the absence of
community members’ participation in other communities is the
result of (1) a decision by community authorities (or significantly
encouraged by those authorities); (2) community members’ free
choice; (3) geographic distance or other physical factors;118 or (4)
other lack of opportunity.119
communities to reside within a specific jurisdiction. See id. This is not the first
time that a religious minority has fled Quebec because of the provincial
government’s enforcement of it secular curriculum. In 2007, members of
Quebec’s only Mennonite community would not send their children to
government-approved schools, balking at the teaching of evolution, the
acceptance of gays and lesbians and low “morality standards.” Even if parents in
the community home-schooled their children, they would have had to follow the
official Quebec curriculum and make arrangements with the local school board,
whereas in Ontario and New Brunswick, parents who home-school their
children are not required to abide by an official government curriculum. Thus,
the Mennonite group fled to New Brunswick and Ontario. See Townsfolk Sad to
see Mennonites Move Away, Montreal Gazette (Aug.16, 2007),
http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=8aa6f3f4-45fd42d3-ad45-38b1106bddfc.
117
See id.
118
Allowing state intervention in geographically remote communities,
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Then, if a community disallows MCB, the state should
determine if the community complies with the state’s LMRs.
While communities that comply with LMRs (and do not comply
with MCB) should not be entirely denied alternative takings
remedies, their refusal to comply with MCB should affect the
scope and scale of their entitlement to these remedies. Finally,
communities that reject both social legitimization tests—MCB and
LMRs—should be denied additional remedies when their property
is expropriated by the state. This assertion implies nothing about
these communities’ conceptions of the good or the role cooperation
plays in their realization. It is simply that these communities’
refusal to comply with either one of the social legitimacy standards
exempts the state from its pluralistic obligation to compensate such
communities for their loss of communality.
Based upon this two-part social legitimacy test, reconsider the
Woodcrest community’s entitlement to additional remedies for loss
of communality.120 As demonstrated in the previous Parts,
Woodcrest clearly has a defined, shared conception of the good,
and cooperation clearly plays a constitutive role in realizing that
good. At first glance, then, the Woodcrest community should
receive additional remedies for communal loss if expropriation
occurs. Nevertheless, some may question the social legitimacy of
the Woodcrest community, arguing that by realizing its shared
conception of the good, the community over-regulates its members
based solely on their remoteness, would unreasonably discriminate against such
communities without properly taking into account whether the community’s
norms are contrary to MCB. In cases where external reasons prevent the
community’s members from simultaneously belonging to several communities,
the community should be able to choose from two alternative paths. The first
alternative is for the community to prove that it allows its members to belong to
other communities. An example of this would be to demonstrate that the
community’s norms encourage such multiple belonging among its members.
The second (and more practical) alternative requires the community to subject
itself to an examination of whether it complies with liberal minimum
requirements.
119
See, e.g., Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, 20
POL. THEORY 105, 134 (1992) (“The most important condition which makes
possible a substantive freedom to exit from a community is the existence of a
wider society that is open to individuals wishing to leave their local groups.”).
120
See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
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and violates conventional liberal norms, in particular by relegating
women to subsidiary roles. Therefore, should the Woodcrest
community lose its entitlement to additional remedies for the loss
of communality?
In order to answer this question the state should start by
determining whether the Woodcrest community passes the MCB
test. If asked, members of the Woodcrest community would
probably answer in the affirmative. The Bruderhof movement does
not prohibit its members from becoming involved with their local
neighborhoods and allows young community members to attend
colleges and universities.121 Some (though not most) of the
community members work outside the community and join other
leisure time interest communities, such as book clubs.122 In short,
Woodcrest members are exposed to outside groups and may freely
choose to exit the community or remain within it. Therefore,
though the Woodcrest community might not fit everyone’s
definition of liberalism, it should still trigger the state’s pluralistic
obligation, entitling the community to additional remedies for the
loss of communality. In concluding that the community meets the
MCB requirement, the state obviates any need for further
investigation into the community’s compliance with LMRs. On the
other hand, if the state concludes that a community’s members do
not belong to multiple communities, it should further investigate
the reasons for this isolation, as well as the community’s
121

FAQ: Do Bruderhof Young People Go to College or University?,
BRUDERHOF, http://www.bruderhof.com/en/about/faq (last visited Sept. 15,
2014). When asked whether college-age members of the Bruderhof community
attend college or University, Tim, a teacher in the community responded:
Yes. Many of the Bruderhof’s young people go to college. We
don’t want young people who grew up in the community to
stay in the community because they think this is the only place
where they can make it. We want them to feel that if they
wanted to, they can go out to the world and earn money and be
a success but to choose life in community because of a calling
from God.
Id.
122
FAQ: Do You Get Involved In Your Local Neighborhood?,
BRUDERHOF, http://www.bruderhof.com/en/about/faq (last visited Sept. 15,
2014).
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compliance with state-determined LMRs. Fortunately, as the
Woodcrest example proves, many of these investigations should be
unnecessary.
C. Community Strength
This Article has thus far discussed how, in the context of the
law’s treatment of CICs, the contours of the state’s pluralistic
obligation should depend on two factors: (1) whether the
community cooperates toward realizing a shared conception of the
good; and (2) whether the community complies with MCB and
LMRs. This section further limits the scope of the state’s
pluralistic obligation by arguing that it should also be contingent
on a community’s political or economic strength. I argue that
stronger communities generally should be treated differently than
weaker, but similarly situated, communities. In the takings law
context, tailoring the remedy in this way best tracks the state’s
pluralistic obligation because it recognizes that some communities
are better situated to continue to flourish post-taking than others.
All kinds of people live in CICs and socioeconomic diversity
can be found in all forms of cooperative ownership. The question
then arises: should takings law distinguish among CICs based on
their economic or political strength? On paper, takings law is blind
to economic or political differences among individuals and
communities. It is generally acknowledged, however, that such
considerations often affect eminent domain decisions. Blight
condemnations, urban renewal programs, and redevelopment
projects—which often serve as the “public use” justification for
eminent domain—all affect, not coincidentally, assets belonging to
poor property owners.123 The current takings law compensation
123

See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed,
87 VA. L. REV. 277, 300 (2001) (“A concern for the distribution of societal
burdens may trump administrative efficiency considerations, and as we showed,
the problem of derivative takings disproportionately harms the poor.”); David A.
Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after Kelo,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 365, 375–76 (2007) (“As a practical matter, however, I
suspect this change means that authorities can continue to use blight
condemnations in poor areas and will face a real challenge only if they attempt
to stretch the blight category to include solidly working-class or (even more so)
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formula, which requires compensating the owner with the fair
market value of the condemned property, incentivizes government
authorities to target the property of poor and politically
marginalized owners rather than property belonging to the rich and
influential.124 As Justice Thomas wrote in his dissent in Kelo v.
City of New London, it is always the economically and politically
weak communities that are expected to bear disproportionately the
burden of realizing public projects.125 Nevertheless, takings law,
given its uniform remedy scheme, fails to take into account the
political or economic wealth of parties subject to takings.
Nevertheless, the contention that takings law should recognize
community strength is based on properly limiting the scope of the
state’s pluralistic obligation. As discussed, foundational pluralism
does not require the state to actively support or promote any
conception of the good. The state’s obligation is limited to
middle-class areas”); Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for
the Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1931 (2007).
124
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 123, at 283 (“Roads and
undesirable public facilities are usually built in poor areas because the value of
property in such areas is lower.”); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, A
Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings, 9 Int’l Rev. L. &
Econ. 115, 122 (1989) (“A common historical account of the rationale for
including the just compensation requirement in the U.S. Constitution is that it
was designed to curb the inclinations of political majorities to impose excessive
burdens on politically isolated minorities.”); Konstantin Sonin, Why the Rich
May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 715 (2003);
Derek Werner, The Public Use Clause, Common Sense and Takings, 10 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 335, 346–47 n.81 (2000) (“While the human nature of
government officials is a potential source of abuse in any legislative decision,
the condemnation decision is particularly susceptible to abuse. First, there is a
strong incentive for interest groups to attempt to influence government officials
and a correspondingly strong incentive for government officials to comply with
their demands. Second, taking property provides an effective means of
subjugating a disfavored group.”).
125
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“Allowing the government to take property solely for public
purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to
encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will
fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only
systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but
are also the least politically powerful.”).
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establishing conditions that allow the existence of diverse
conceptions of the good that comply with the LMR and MCB
model requirements. Such an obligation may require distinguishing
among communities based on certain characteristics for the
purpose of allocating takings remedies, but the state should only
seek to ensure pluralism by rectifying inadequacies in the law that
make it extremely difficult or impossible for certain communities
to continue flourishing post-taking.
Ensuring that takings law fulfills the state’s pluralistic
obligation justifies taking into account communities’ political or
economic strength and compensating strong communities less than
similarly situated, but weaker, communities. Stronger communities
are more likely to have the resources and influence to avoid the
damaging effects of eminent domain without government
assistance.126 Politically strong communities may use their political
ties and influence to fend off expropriation, and economically
strong communities may be safe because of the high costs that the
state would incur by taking their land.127 Moreover, members of
these communities are less likely to lose their ability to realize
their shared notion of the good—whether jointly or separately—if
their land is in fact condemned. Members of politically strong
communities usually share the same sense of the good as the
majority of the public. Therefore, even if expropriation affects
such a community’s functioning, community members are
expected to be able to continue realizing their shared conception of
good by joining other similar communities. In addition, even if a
politically strong community does not share the majority’s
conception of the good, it may still use its political influence to
bypass bureaucratic barriers in reestablishing itself. Members of
126

Naturally, communities that enjoy political or economic strength are
less likely to be subject to eminent domain in the first place. See, e.g., Daniel A.
Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
125, 130 (1992) (“[I]f public choice theory has any one key finding, it is that
small groups with high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the
political process. Thus, landowners have some political advantages in seeking
compensation.”); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 863–65
(1995).
127
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 123, at 283.
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economically strong communities also are more likely to preserve
their conception of the good than those in weaker communities
since they are more likely to have the resources to independently
reestablish the community.
Therefore, belonging to a politically or economically strong
community reduces the concern that community members will lose
their ability to realize their conception of the good, even when the
community’s ability to function is affected by the government’s
exercise of eminent domain. Accordingly, the need for the state to
actively intervene to help these communities is reduced, and may
in fact be a waste of government resources. At the same time, it is
entirely possible that members of these communities will
sometimes encounter difficulties in the face of expropriation.
Therefore, politically or economically strong communities should
not be completely excluded from an alternative remedy scheme.
However, keeping in mind the purpose of the reform and the
state’s pluralistic obligation, these communities should receive
reduced benefits.
III.

WHO GETS WHAT?
OF REMEDIES

DETERMINING

THE

PROPER ALLOCATION

In practice, how should the principles and guidelines discussed
above shape a reform of takings law? How should the government
actually allocate alternative takings remedies and what form should
these remedies take? This Article proposes reforming takings law
not only through the explicit recognition of various conceptions of
the good, but also by recognizing that the state may use diverse
mechanisms to fulfill its pluralistic obligations. Any reform should
enhance the ability of people to live in accordance with their
values and beliefs, while at the same time acknowledging other
social values (such as autonomy, efficiency, and distributive
justice). Expanding the range of potential takings remedies gives
meaning to an individual’s choice of residential configuration.
Alternative takings remedies should include non-monetary or inkind benefits, and should be allocated based upon the needs of the
affected community in relation to the three considerations outlined
previously: the community’s conception of the good, social
legitimacy, and political and economic strength. This approach
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strikes the right balance between the pluralistic principle that
supports various communities’ continued functioning and other
competing considerations, such as efficiency and liberty.
A. New Remedies Tailored to Community Needs
For the state to fulfill its pluralistic obligation, the selection of
remedies should begin by determining the nature of the taking and
its influence on the community members’ ability to continue
realizing a shared conception of the good. Parchomovsky and
Siegelman split expropriations into three categories.128 First,
“Isolated” expropriations are those that affect only one or a few
community members.129 Second, “Tipping” expropriations are
those where the government condemns multiple properties in a
given residential community, and in doing so, potentially threatens
the community’s ability to continue functioning.130 Third,
“Clearing” expropriations are those that uproot the entire
community.131
For certain small-scale takings, a market-value mechanism may
still be appropriate. However, it is likely only to fulfill the
individualistic dimension of the state’s pluralistic obligation.132
Therefore, for Isolated and small-scale Tipping condemnations that
do not threaten a community’s shared conception of the good, but
only result in the private loss of one or a few individuals, simple
fair-market value compensation may remain preferable. In largescale expropriations, however, particularly where the community
engages in constitutive cooperation, the market value mechanism
may not protect the community’s future cooperation toward the
realization of a shared conception of the good. Providing fair
market value compensation to individual owners in these cases
does not account for this loss of communality, and therefore is by
itself an inadequate means for the state to fulfill its pluralistic
obligation.
128
129
130
131
132

Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 84.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 138.
See supra note 40.
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Legal scholars have proposed other takings remedies that
compensate individuals for losses that go beyond the property’s
market value. Property scholar Robert Ellickson, has argued for a
fixed premium in cases where a property’s fair market value fails
to cover the owner’s subjective losses, by “award[ing] damages for
the drop in market value plus a bonus award to compensate for loss
of the commonly held irreplaceable consumer surplus.”133 For
efficiency reasons, commentators generally seek to establish this
additional compensation at a fixed rate, without any distinction
made between different community members.134 However, a fixed
premium that uniformly indemnifies owners for personal losses
may have little advantage over market value compensation in
terms of redressing loss of communality. This is because a fixed
premium does not distinguish among community members
according to their involvement in the community, their
contribution to maintaining cooperation, or their commitment to a
shared conception of the good.
When a substantial number of community members are
affected, as in Tipping expropriations, a variable premium could
overcome the difficulties facing the fixed premium mechanism. A
variable premium is more capable of recognizing the salient
differences among members’ contributions to cooperation and
commitment to the community.135 While it does not have the
advantage of cost certainty attendant to market value or fixed
premium compensation, this concern can be somewhat mitigated
through the adoption of rules of thumb in lieu of calculating the
actual loss suffered by each community member. For example, one
such rule of thumb might concern the nature of the community
member’s property rights (owning versus renting) or provide
proportionate increases in compensation to individuals based on
the length of time they have lived in the community.136
133

Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736 (1973).
134
Id.; Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 139.
135
See Ellickson, supra note 133, at 737.
136
Another assumption is that the longer one lives in a community, the
more significant the role she plays in the community’s continuation of
cooperation, and the more she is affected by the loss of that cooperation.
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Direct community resettlement is another potential remedy.137
Application of a direct resettlement remedy requires the state to
reestablish the community in a new location. Such application may
range from complete resettlement, in which the state builds new
homes for the expropriated property owners, to cases in which the
government funds the building of the owners’ new homes. Direct
resettlement of a community may additionally require the state to
fund (or to establish) common property (such as roads,
playgrounds and social institutions). Like other takings remedies,
resettlement seeks to put the owner in the same position she was in
before her property was condemned, but shifts most of the burden
from the owner to the state and challenges the implicit assumption
of takings law that all property is fungible. The resettlement
mechanism is also unique in that it creates an ongoing relationship
between the government and property owner, rather than a onetime exchange of money and property. Breaking the link between
money and property might placate critics concerned with
commodification of property and community,138 increase
efficiency (especially because it saves the costs of evaluating
subjective losses), and more importantly, fulfill the collective
dimension of the state’s pluralistic obligation.139 On the other
hand, the establishment of an ongoing relationship between the
state and individuals who have been subject to expropriation
creates financial uncertainty and entails significant negotiation and
monitoring costs that exceed those associated with one-shot
compensation. Therefore, the use of a direct resettlement remedy
should be limited only to instances where the collective dimension
of the state’s pluralistic obligation arises. This would usually only
be the case in Clearing and large-scale Tipping expropriations.
Finally, the government may provide indirect resettlement
remedies that foster community rehabilitation. These indirect
remedies are most likely to take the form of financial assistance or
removal of bureaucratic barriers. For example, the government
may provide tax benefits, exemptions from zoning regulations,
special condition loans, or financial grants. Like direct
137
138
139

See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 31, at 138.
See discussion on anti-commodification in Part IV.B.
See supra note 39.
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resettlement, these remedies do not explicitly equate property with
money and may reduce commodifying effects and evaluation costs
for subjective losses. They also offer the community customized
solutions without overstretching the state’s resources. Moreover,
indirect resettlement remedies may fulfill both the individualistic
and collective dimension of the state’s pluralistic obligation.140
Indirect remedies, however, provide only limited and partial
assistance—they do not offer a comprehensive solution for loss of
communality. They do not guarantee any particular result. Along
with uncertainty regarding property owners’ abilities to use these
forms of assistance, the state cannot easily monitor how a
community uses these tools, leaving them prone to improper
use.141 Moreover, the broadly applicable nature of indirect
resettlement remedies raises concerns that the state may abuse
these remedies by granting them in an unequal manner.
Nevertheless, such remedies may provide a balanced solution for
Tipping expropriations, which impair but do not completely
prevent community members from realizing their shared
conception of the good.
The allocation of these additional remedies should depend on
the scope and scale of the government’s exercise of eminent
domain within the community as well as the three factors discussed
in Part II. The overarching goal is to restrict the availability of
additional compensation or in-kind remedies to communities
whose members engage in cooperation that expresses the value of
community in property and who stand to lose their ability to
cooperate after their land is taken.

140

Id.
One example of such an improper use may be trading in such benefits.
For example, an owner who is entitled to a loan under special conditions
(substantially better than those prevailing in the market) might trade the loan to
profit from the interest rate differentials. Owners may also misuse planning
easements, which allow them to deviate from certain construction restrictions.
They may trade these benefits (for example, by selling their houses) for
economic gain. While the state may restrict the trade in such benefits, such
restrictions may hold only for a short period of time, before turning into a too
heavy burden on individuals’ autonomy to use their property rights.
141
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B. Tying Remedies to a Community’s Conception of the
Good, Social Legitimacy, and Community Strength

The remedies outlined above should be applied in direct
relation to the community’s characteristics as outlined in Part II.
With respect to the first factor—the role of cooperation in the
community’s ability to realize its members’ shared conception of
the good—the more significant the role of cooperation in the
community’s ability to realize its conception of the good, the
greater the need for remedies that would allow the continuation of
that cooperation. Thus, for example, communities that engage in
constitutive cooperation are most likely to require remedies that
facilitate the community’s continued existence such as direct
resettlement assistance. When, on the other hand, cooperation
plays a relatively marginal role, monetary compensation is likely to
be a satisfactory remedy, with the size of the premium contingent
upon how marginal that role is. An examination of the role of
cooperation should inquire into the extent to which the community
has established communal institutions and customs in furtherance
of its beliefs.142
A community’s social legitimacy also should impact the
remedies it receives.143 The availability of remedies should be
contingent on either the extent to which the community is
structurally open through MCB, or whether the community
complies with the state’s LMRs. If the community does neither, the
state’s pluralistic obligation is not triggered and the community’s
142

See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 134-60 (1993)
(“[C]ommunities form around institutions such as schools and community
policing stations.”); David M. Chavis & J.R. Newbrough, The Meaning of
“Community” in Community Psychology, 14 J. CMTY PSYCHOL. 335, 338
(2006); Robin S. Golden, Toward a Model of Community Representation for
Legal Assistance Lawyering: Examining the Role of Legal Assistance Agencies
in Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 527,
530 (1998) (“These institutions represent the efforts of individual neighborhood
residents to identify and solve their own problems. They are, I contend, the
voices of the community.”); William Sewell, The Concept(s) of Culture, in
BEYOND THE CULTURAL TURN: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF SOCIETY
AND CULTURE 37, 55-57 (Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt eds., 1999).
143
See supra Part II.B.
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members should not be entitled to any alternative takings remedies.
A community ideally satisfies the social legitimacy requirement by
allowing MCB, and in such cases should be entitled to a remedy
designed to enable the community’s continued functioning.
Communities that comply only with state LMRs do not exhibit the
same level of social legitimacy, and so the state should only be
required to indirectly assist in their reestablishment.
The third factor, community strength, recognizes that the
state’s pluralistic obligation does not require intervention when the
goal of this obligation—to allow all citizens to live in accordance
with their values and beliefs—is not in jeopardy.144 The selection
of remedies, therefore, should depend on the community’s ability
to continuously realize its conception of the good postexpropriation without state assistance. Politically and economically
strong communities are more likely to be able to rehabilitate
themselves post-expropriation.145 Because weaker communities are
less able to counter the threat that expropriation poses to their
realization of the good, the state’s obligation should include a
remedy that will foster the community’s continued cooperation.
To summarize, the selection of remedies should primarily
depend on the three factors discussed in Part II: the role of
cooperation in the community’s realization of a shared conception
of the good, the community’s social legitimacy, and the
community’s political and economic strength. Additionally, the
scale and scope of the expropriation should be taken into account.
Fair market value compensation is likely an adequate remedy in
cases of Isolated takings that are not expected to significantly alter
the community fabric. The additional remedies of fixed premiums
and indirect resettlement assistance may be appropriate for Isolated
and Tipping expropriations to remedy any loss of the affected
members’ ability to cooperate. These remedies, as well as variable
premiums, should also be used for certain Clearing expropriations
144

See supra Part II.C.
These politically and economically strong communities are also less
likely to be the target of condemnation. See supra notes 122–24 and
accompanying text. Further, even when they become the subject of
condemnation, these communities are more likely to fend off government
takings at the outset.
145
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where cooperation plays a less central role in the community’s
realization of its conception of the good, or the community is
politically or economically strong or does not allow MCB. The
level of assistance and size of the premiums should also vary
depending on the extent of the community’s fulfillment of the three
factors. Finally, direct resettlement should also be available to
certain communities subject to Tipping and Clearing
expropriations depending on the interplay of the three factors
discussed in Part II. For instance, direct resettlement would be
appropriate for weak, MCB-compliant communities that engage in
constitutive cooperation.146
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS ADDRESSED
This Part will address three potential counterarguments to the
reform proposed in this article: (1) the subjective value argument,
which questions the need of the state to compensate owners for the
loss of subjective values embodied in their property rights; (2) the
anti-commodification argument, which questions the desirability of
distinct treatment of CICs in takings law, due to concerns about
placing a price on communality; and (3) the neutrality argument,
founded on a concern over the state’s equal treatment of similarly
situated actors and the possible abuse of benefits. These objections
may explain why, despite the normative appeal of pluralism,
alternative treatment of certain CICs has not yet been
implemented. As I explain, however, none of these arguments
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Even direct resettlement may prove ineffective in certain scenarios,
however, such as when the geographic location of a community is essential to its
conception of the good. See, e.g., BRIAN EDWARD BROWN, RELIGION, LAW, AND
THE LAND: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SACRED
LAND 13 (1999) (“[B]ut if the reserve of their ancestors and the preservation of
and access to Chota and other village sites of historical and cultural significance
were dimensions of the religion that the Cherokees sought to protect, the heart of
their complaint was the notion that the waters and land of the river valley were
themselves sacred, holy realities that would be destroyed by the impeding
Tellico project.”). The use of such a remedy should be contingent upon the
consent of the number of members needed for the community to continue
realizing its conception of the good, which would vary from case to case.
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justifies a uniform treatment of residential configurations in
takings law.
A. Subjective Values Argument
The use of a single comprehensive remedy for all residential
takings might be justified if differences among configurations are
seen as dependent merely on owners’ subjective preferences.
According to this view, an owner’s choice of residential
configuration at least partially reflects her personal preference for
particular values or ways of living. While expropriation may cost
the owner more than just physical property, this additional loss is
not compensable because of its subjective nature. While courts do
not reject the possibility that such losses may occur and have
acknowledged that property owners are not fully compensated in
such cases, they reject additional compensation on the ground that
it is too difficult to evaluate subjective losses.147 Property scholar
Brian Lee goes even further. He recently argued that the market
value standard almost fully compensates for subjective losses.148
According to Lee, the subjective losses that the market value
standard does not cover are idiosyncratic, and there is reason to
doubt whether people should in fact be compensated for such
losses at all.149
147

See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511
(1979) (“Because of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth an
individual places on particular property at a given time, we have recognized the
need for a relatively objective working rule.”).
148
Brian A. Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in
Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 607–17 (2013) (Lee argues that
owners’ “subjective value” can be divided into several distinct types of values,
such as sentimental value, alterations to the property made by the owner,
location benefits, out of pocket expenses, information costs, potential gains from
trade, and autonomy. Lee concludes that fair market value compensation does
not neglect entire categories of condemnees’ subjective value in their property—
aside from the value of each condemnee’s own autonomy—but instead provides
at least partial compensation for a significant amount of that value).
149
See id. at 616, 635–49. Lee also argues that market value does not
include the loss of autonomy suffered by property owners as a result of their
forced evictions. Id. at 615–16. However, this loss, to the extent it exists, is
shared equally by all property owners who are subject to expropriation, and
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The subjective nature of these additional losses, however, does
not justify the existing takings remedy scheme. First, Lee’s core
principle, that society should not bear the costs of certain
individuals’ idiosyncratic losses, is of dubious validity. A state’s
obligation to ensure a pluralistic society may indeed require it to
take into account, at least to some extent, its citizens’
idiosyncrasies.150 The obligation does not demand automatic
recognition of any and all idiosyncratic values, but does require a
careful evaluation of the connection between such values and an
individual’s choice of residential configuration.151 Second, the
availability of in-kind remedies can overcome the difficulty of
measuring the monetary value of subjective losses.152
Finally, changing the treatment CICs receive in takings law is
justified even accepting Lee’s argument that subjective values are
for the most part accounted for in a property’s fair market value.
This is because a property’s fair market value is not always easily
ascertained and additional compensation through in-kind remedies
could alleviate this problem. As Lee demonstrates, calculating
therefore, as Lee argues, there is no reason to compensate any individual
condemnees differently on this basis. Id. at 636–45.
150
This, I argue, is especially important with respect to cooperation that is
constitutive of a community’s ability to realize its conception of the good. See
supra Part II.A. Commitment to foundational pluralism as a source of the state’s
obligation to recognize differences between residential configurations in takings
law differs from establishing such a claim on a social capital basis. Justifying
differential treatment of residential configurations out of a commitment to
pluralism is not dependent on these configurations’ contributions to the social
capital of society, but rather on the ability of owners to realize their conceptions
of the good. Thus, such a justification avoids most concerns regarding the
contribution of residential communities to social capital. Cf. Stern, supra note 5
(arguing that residential “micro-institutions”, such as CICs, do play a role in
increasing or decreasing social capital).
151
Such recognition should also be supported by autonomyenhancing pluralists, who believe that a person’s autonomous choices should be
respected by the state. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 8, at xvii; Dagan, supra note
101, at 1412. Regarding a person’s choice of a specific residential configuration
as an expression of her autonomy raises questions for Lee as well, since he
recognizes the loss of autonomy due to expropriation as compensable. See Lee,
supra note 148, at 615.
152
See supra Part III.A.
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takings compensation based on previous transactions involving
identically configured properties indeed entails an implicit
assessment of subjective losses, as the other owners would
presumably have considered such losses when selling.153 However,
this assumption does not hold if there are few or no transactions
involving other similarly situated properties.154 Lee’s argument
against compensating for certain subjective losses calls for
categorizing properties on the basis of whether there exists a
sufficiently large market for identically configured properties and
therefore encounters difficulties when, for example, an entire
community is uprooted. In-kind remedies that would allow the
continued existence and functioning of the community may be
especially appropriate in these circumstances.
The existing comprehensive takings compensation formula,
therefore, cannot be justified on the ground that the values
underlying differences between residential configurations are
merely subjective in nature. This standard disregards differences
among residential configurations in a way that violates individual
owners’ property rights and, equally important, interferes with the
ability of certain CICs to flourish.155 A person’s choice of
residential configuration reflects her deeper commitment to certain
fundamental values by which she desires to live. In a pluralistic
society, the law should not ignore the different values informing
such choices, even those which might be described as
idiosyncratic.
B. Anti-Commodification Concerns
Commodification has become a focal point in delineating
market boundaries and in the division of labor between the market
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But see Lee A. Fennell, Just Enough, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
109, 112 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/just-enough_fennell/ (“[T]here is
reason to doubt that typical amounts of sentimental value and other
individualized costs wind up in FMV.”).
154
See id. at 113–14 (questioning Lee’s logic even in the context of
identical properties).
155
See supra Part I.B.
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and the state.156 Using several different rationales, anticommodification proponents object to substantial permeation of
market norms into spheres, institutions, and relationships that
traditionally are not open to sale. The two most prominent of these
rationales are based upon concerns of corruption of values and
economic coercion.157 The commodification concern is found in
156

Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, The State and the Market—A Parable:
On the State’s Commodifying Effects, 3 PUB. REASON 44, 44 (2011).
157
Michael Sandel first recognized two broad categories of anticommodification arguments: corruption and coercion. See Michael Sandel, What
Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, in 21 THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94–96 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000). The corruption
rationale essentially accords with a pluralistic understanding of society. As
Elizabeth argues, “If different spheres of social life, such as the market, the
family and the state, are structured by norms that express fundamentally
different ways of valuing people and things, then there can be some ways we
ought to value people and things that can’t be expressed through market norms.”
See ANDERSON, supra note 9, at xiii. The corruption rationale has both practical
and normative aspects. The practical aspect posits that when values are
cognitively incommensurable, people are unable to make certain value
comparisons because they have no basis for determining how much of X to give
up in exchange for Y. In other words, X and Y are measured on different scales,
frustrating our ability to make any comparison between them. The normative
aspect suggests that not only is it not practically possible to compare things that
are evaluated on different scales, but any attempt to do so, in itself, corrupts the
intrinsic meaning we give to these things, i.e., “certain moral and civic goods are
diminished or corrupted if bought and sold for money.” Sandel, supra at 122.
Indeed, such an attempt “points to the degrading effect of market valuation and
exchange on certain goods and practices.” Id. Out of a commitment to
foundational pluralism, this understanding assumes the existence of different
spheres, wherein people are able to use different modes of evaluation. Given the
existence of different spheres, valuations or exchanges, metrics from one sphere
will necessarily invade or crowd out other modes of evaluation or comparison.
Such an exchange is corrupting when it ignores the differences between these
spheres of valuation and forces us to value all goods in the same manner.
Quite a different rationale for objecting to the adoption of market
mechanisms in non-market spheres involves the fear that people will be forced
to act in a way that they naturally oppose. Glenn Cohen splits Sandel’s coercion
argument into two sub-arguments, which differ in the type of harm caused by
the transaction that is emphasized. The first, which Cohen terms the
“voluntariness” argument, asks whether consent to the transaction was truly
voluntary given the seller’s socioeconomic status. For instance, the poor may be
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many areas of research such as inter-personal relationships,158
personal gestures,159 education,160 health,161 and culture.162 Our
forced to sell their valuable assets, only because they will not be able to resist
the monetary reward. The second sub-argument Cohen raises, the “access”
argument, differs from the first one in that it does not examine the seller’s
condition but rather that of the purchaser. Here, the focus is on unequal access
to the goods, given an unfair background distribution of those goods. The
concern is that only some will be able to afford the good if it is commodified,
“that surrogacy will be used for the benefit of the rich at the expense of the
poor.” This is quite a different argument and expands the meaning of coercion to
encompass the economic improbability of certain individuals purchasing goods.
Although these two arguments differ from each other, they both are based on the
existence of fundamental economic inequality in society. For each argument, the
concern over market expansion into spheres of life generally perceived to be
outside the reach of the market reflects the will to avoid spreading economic
inequality into these spheres. See Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of
Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 69091 (2003).
158
See, e.g., MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE
TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS AND OTHER THINGS 3–
4, 97–98 (1996).
159
See, e.g., Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money—Or
Both?, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 123 (2000); Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1907 (1986); Lee Taft, Apology
Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000).
160
See, e.g., Rajani Naidoo & Ian Jamieson, Knowledge in the
Marketplace: The Global Commodification of Teaching and Learning in Higher
Education, in 16 INTERNATIONALIZING HIGHER EDUCATION: CERC STUDIES IN
COMPARATIVE EDUCATION 37 (Peter Ninnes & Meeri Hellstén eds., 2005);
Rajani Naidoo, Repositioning Higher Education as a Global Commodity:
Opportunities and Challenges for Future Sociology of Education Work, 24 BRIT.
J. SOC. EDUC. 249 (2003); Anthony R. Welch, For Sale, by Degrees: Overseas
Students and the Commodification of Higher Education in Australia and the
United Kingdom, 34 INT’L REV. EDUC. 387, 388 (1988); Hugh Willmott,
Managing the Academics: Commodification and Control in the Development of
University Education in the U.K., 48 HUM. RELS. 993 (1995).
161
See,
e.g.,
Ronald
L.
Caplan,
The Commodification of
American Health Care, 28 S OC . S CI. & M ED . 1139 (1989); Arthur W. Frank,
What’s Wrong with Medical Consumerism?, in CONSUMING HEALTH: THE
COMMODIFICATION OF HEALTH CARE 13 (Saras Henderson & Alan R. Petersen
eds., 2002).
162
See, e.g., Regina Austin, Kwanzaa and the Commodification of Black
Culture, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READING IN LAW AND

196

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

handling of these relationships and institutions should therefore be
sensitive to commodifying effects, which can harm the meaning
we attach to them.
The thrust of the anti-commodification corruption argument is
that when the government takes an individual’s property for the
public’s benefit and monetarily compensates the individual, the
property in question is commodified, since it indicates that the
property is interchangeable with a fixed amount of money.163 In
this regard, “[t]he notion of eminent domain constitutionalizes
fungibility.”164 If we accept the pluralistic conception of property
ownership—that property ownership can reflect several different
values (such as community, autonomy, and personhood), then
treating property and money as interchangeable is particularly
problematic. Eminent domain thus commodifies not just the
physical property taken, but also commodifies and thus corrupts
the values owners wish to express through it.
Moreover, according to the anti-commodification argument,
the corrupting effects of takings are not limited to the specific act
of condemnation. Current takings remedies, which declare that
property, any property, is interchangeable with money, affect
society’s perception of property. Anti-commodification proponents
argue that it is only reasonable to assume that if the state treats
property as a commodity, regardless of its meaning to the owner’s
personhood or identity, the public will view property the same way
and act accordingly. According to a pluralistic conception of
property, such an understanding of property is problematic, since it
robs property of whatever deeper values its owners (and society)
might attribute to it.
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By increasing the number of variables to which a government
should attach value when it expropriates private property, the
proposed takings regime might at first blush seem to increase the
commodification of property. But a closer examination of the
situation reveals that the reform would not exacerbate, but instead
blunt commodification effects.
First, establishing a range of remedies beyond fixed monetary
compensation would allow the state to appropriately tailor the
remedy to the affected individual or community based on the
community’s distinct characteristics. The availability of in-kind
remedies would actually reduce the commodifying effects of
government takings. By rejecting the premise of market value
compensation—that all property is interchangeable with money—
and taking into account the different characteristics and underlying
values of CICs, an alternative remedies scheme would allay
commodification concerns. While unraveling the relationship
between money and property would not completely eliminate the
commodifying effects inherent in government takings, it would
curtail the corrupting effects of the existing legal regime.
Nor would compensation for loss of communality exacerbate
the second concern related to commodification: coercion arising
from economic inequality. Distinguishing among communities
involves the use of various compensation mechanisms and other
remedies to address the additional losses that a community’s
members might suffer due to expropriation. Some of these
remedies are likely to take the form of compensation in excess of a
property’s fair market value, or alternatively, non-monetary
benefits that may be translated into actual or potential economic
gains. One could make an anti-commodification argument that
these “surpluses” will incentivize both property owners and
expropriating authorities to participate in eminent domain
proceedings that involve special remedies. A race to the bottom
may occur where economically disadvantaged communities
compete with each other to transfer their property to the state in
exchange for an attractive surplus of monetary compensation. In
addition, providing remedies that compensate property owners
beyond market value may also remove the significant, if not
insurmountable, cognitive barrier that state actors face when they
seek to condemn properties, and the removal of this barrier could
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potentially lead to more, and larger, expropriations.165 Providing
the state with multiple remedies for expropriation—some of which
exceed the property’s market value—could break this barrier,
incentivizing the state to further expropriate residential
communities’ property. Thus, ironically, incorporation of the
significance of CICs into takings law may lead to more
expropriation in such communities. Yet, these concerns are also
mitigated by the expansion of the range of remedies’ and by the
reforms sensitive to the characteristics of given communities.
A race to the bottom, however, should occur only when
property owners can reliably expect to receive surplus
compensation. Under the proposed reform, each community would
be granted different, individually-tailored remedies. Thus, a
community or property owner would have no guarantee of extra
monetary compensation, alleviating concerns over a race to the
bottom. Furthermore, the higher cost of implementing these
tailored remedies should allay concerns that the proposal
incentivizes the state to more readily expropriate property. As
discussed in Part III, differential treatment of residential
communities in takings law entails additional costs that exceed
those imposed on the state under current law. While these
additional costs may be justified to fulfill the state’s pluralistic
obligation, they nevertheless serve as a new barrier to
expropriation. Therefore, while the proposed reform may break the
behavioral barrier to expropriations that under-compensation
creates, a new economic barrier—based on the higher costs of the
proposed reform’s remedies—should diminish fears of increased
expropriation.
165

This cognitive barrier may be explained both in behavioral terms and
in economic terms. Assume that a state is planning to build a hospital and has
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undercompensated. For such a cognitive barrier, see Uri Gneezy & Aldo
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C. Maintaining State Neutrality
According to the neutrality argument, the state, within certain
limits, should remain neutral in regard to how people choose to
live their lives, including how people decide to own and use their
property. Consequently, the state should be reluctant to
compensate differently individuals in various CICs because such
distinctions might be interpreted as the state favoring one
residential configuration over another.
The neutrality argument has deep roots in American political
tradition, culture, and property law, and so cannot be easily
dismissed.166 Most proponents of the neutrality argument hold that
neutrality means the state should not involve itself in subjective or
idiosyncratic measures of value. Yet establishing a takings remedy
scheme that redresses additional harms that CICs incur would
actually preserve state neutrality rather than undermine it. This
proposal rejects the interpretation of neutrality as a complete
withdrawal of the state from involvement in the determination of
ownership forms or from its obligation to allow such forms to
exist. Instead, neutrality should be reinterpreted as an opportunity
for the state to fulfill its pluralistic obligation and to allow citizens
to freely choose their desired property arrangements.
A government’s attempt to remain neutral by adopting a
completely passive role may actually disfavor certain conceptions
of the good by making their pursuit difficult or impossible. Thus,
in order to fulfill its pluralistic obligation, the state should be
required to actively ensure the existence and survival of various
residential configurations. But can a state that actively supports a
diversity of residential configurations remain neutral? Joseph Raz
argues that political neutrality is best interpreted as a state’s
disinclination to either promote one conception of the good or to
direct a person to choose one conception of the good over
another.167 Accounting for loss of communality in takings law is
consistent with both of these interpretations of political neutrality.
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The proposal offered in this Article would not promote a
particular conception of the good. If anything, it would push
against the impression that individualistic residential
configurations are the only means of achieving the good life. By
incorporating the distinct characteristics of CICs into takings law,
the state would actually restore the balance between different
residential configurations, putting all of them on equal footing.
Such an approach does not change the likelihood that a person will
endorse one conception of the good over another. The availability
of alternative remedies would probably not inordinately increase
the number of people living in highly cooperative communities as
living in those communities would still involve significant
restrictions on individual property rights. Rather, it would promote
neutrality by removing the structural bias against such
communities which, under the current scheme, are uniquely at risk
of under-compensation for community-related losses.
Finally, the individualistic nature of the existing compensation
scheme in takings law does not ensure all citizens’ ability to live
by their values and beliefs. An alternative remedy scheme that
gives meaning to individuals’ choices of residential configurations
would promote state neutrality. By disregarding the unique
characteristics of more cooperative communities, current takings
law sends a clear message concerning the state’s preference for
individualistic forms of ownership. This message may have a
twofold effect on individual owners. First, it may prevent them
from choosing to reside in CICs in the first place. Second, and
equally troubling from the standpoint of foundational pluralism, it
may affect the way in which owners manage these communities,
threatening the communities’ cooperative nature.168 In order for the
state to become truly neutral—to “ensure for all persons an equal
168

When the law conceives of property in purely individualistic terms, it
hinders people’s ability to treat or think of property any differently. Many
people may be discouraged from trying to live in accordance with views of
property ownership that are at odds with the monistic individualist
understanding of property that underlies existing property law. For example, the
conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of a CIC may not include any
demand for sacrifice on behalf of owners for the sake of community, or even
reciprocal relationship, as such demand may harm the individualistic
understanding of property ownership.
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ability to pursue in their lives and promote in their societies any
ideal of the good of their choosing”169—the law should take into
account the distinct characteristics of less individualistic forms of
ownership. The concept of state neutrality thus actually supports
accounting for communal loss.
CONCLUSION
When the government takes property, individuals who live in
highly cooperative common interest communities face an
especially large risk of being short-changed under the existing
takings scheme, which merely provides them with the fair market
value of the condemned property. This Article proposes guidelines
for reforming takings law to provide additional remedies to
members of these communities to compensate them for their loss
of communality. The guidelines involve consideration of three
important factors, namely, the role of cooperation in a
community’s realization of a conception of the good; the
community’s social legitimacy as determined primarily by its
structural openness; and the political and economic strength of the
community. Alternative remedies may take the form of fixed and
variable monetary premiums that compensate individuals beyond
the fair market value of the condemned property, and in-kind
remedies, such as direct community resettlement and indirect
assistance with resettlement.
The proposed guidelines are sensitive to the characteristics of
each community in question, recognizing that there is great
variation even among common interest communities. Insofar as we
accept that an individual’s choice of residential configuration tells
us something about her values, preferences, and relationships with
others, we need to incorporate this vision into our laws. The
proposed guidelines further the state’s obligation to ensure a
pluralistic society.
Property law is a social instrument. It should not be detached
from our social values, but should facilitate individuals’ ability to
pursue their vision of the good life through cooperation. The law in
general, and property law in particular, plays a critical role in
169
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enabling social diversity. The proposed guidelines contribute to
that effort.

